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


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A RAND NOTE

The Declining Threat to U.S. Interests

Thomas J. Hirschfeld



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A RAND NOTE

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The Declining Threat to U.S. Interests

Thomas J. Hirschfeld

**Prepared for the
United States Army**

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PREFACE

The profound global and regional changes since 1989, including the end of the Cold War, suggest reexamining U.S. interests abroad and reexamining the threats to those interests, both globally and regionally. Such a reexamination is a necessary precursor to force planning for the 1990s and beyond.

This study is a preliminary qualitative attempt to identify generic global and regional U.S. interests, to suggest what threats to those interests remain, and to postulate additional future risks the United States might face that have military implications from present circumstances. This document should therefore be of interest to those engaged in planning and sizing ready and reserve forces for overseas operations.

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SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Most of the familiar context for military planning disappeared with the diminution and reconfiguration of Soviet forces and with the decline of Soviet and now Russian support for former clients in Europe, Asia, and the Third World. Thus, the chances of some remote brushfire escalating to global conflagration are vastly diminished. Stated otherwise, the republic is safer than it has been for more than a century. As a result, global and regional stability have become harder to define, once removed from the strategic nuclear or East-West context. As used by politicians, the distinctions between instability and uncertainty and between threat and risk become increasingly unclear. On the other hand, new kinds of disturbances are certain to arise with transnational actors, troubles that could involve U.S. citizens, their lives, or property as targets of movements bent on calling attention to and righting perceived injustice.

If the classic incentives for warfare remain, in the sense that many foreign countries will still worry about security, territory, influence, resources, and the welfare of ethnic fellows or coreligionists, it is now less clear why most of the conflicts that could be generated by such interests directly concern the United States. Even so, the United States would want to prevent local troubles from growing into problems that involve major powers. That interest underpins the remaining presence missions for U.S. military services, a presence that reminds adventurous local actors of the risks they could run.

Generically, threats that imply the use of armed forces still include attacks on U.S. citizens, allies, or installations in friendly countries; threats to vital communication links, to freedom of navigation, or to access to vital resources; or dangers to the survival or cohesion of important friendly states. Newer kinds of risks involve potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by unfriendly states, movements, or societies; violations of important accepted international norms by unfriendly governments or other bodies; and natural or man-made disaster on some massive scale.

EUROPE

U.S. interests in Europe are still to ensure that no power or combination of powers establishes hegemony, that our historical and sentimental ties with important European countries remain strong and healthy, and that European integration and transatlantic trade continue to progress in the common interest. We continue to hope that our community of

outlook with Western Europe can expand to include the rest of the Continent and flourish, thereby providing some continuing basis for common action, both inside and outside of Europe.

Risks in Europe with military implications include the fallout from the internal turmoil in the former USSR, revival of ethnic tensions and territorial claims in Eastern Europe, and threats to the Continent from outside. If Russian reversion to type poses the most dangerous if least likely short-term military risk to Europe, turmoil and internal collapse of successor republics suggest other types of dangers. These include loss of central control over some nuclear weapons, civil war, and conflict between newly formed "republics" over territory or resources, or between those same "republics" and non-"Soviet" neighbors over similar questions. And such risks as ethnic tensions and conflicting territorial claims are not confined to former Soviet territory. The internal disintegration of Yugoslavia over such questions is too well understood now to require further description here. Greek/Turkish differences over Cyprus or the Aegean continental shelf or Turkish/Bulgar minority issues clearly exemplify the rich variety of historical disputes in Eastern Europe. Although many of these issues will resurface, few imply any direct or unilateral action by the United States or even an obvious need for U.S. forces. If some external risks to the security of Europe persist, they are less than mortal. These largely reflect issues between the Maghreb countries and Spain, France and Italy; terrorist problems; immigration issues; and Middle East weapon-acquisition concerns—questions where European partners have as much or more to worry about than the United States.

ASIA

What remains of our confrontation with Communist governments now seems largely confined to East and Southeast Asia, although the ideological element is much reduced. U.S. interests there still involve denying any power or combination of powers regional domination, and ensuring continuing and unimpeded technical and commercial interchange with and between the states of these regions (especially now that more than 40 percent of U.S. trade is with the Pacific Rim). To these ends, we continue to foster security cooperation and democracy where possible.

In Northeast Asia, pursuit of these U.S. interests involves ensuring the health and survival of the bilateral relationships we enjoy with Japan, China, South Korea, and now with Russia. In the absence of a regional security arrangement like NATO in Europe, these bilateral links help calm historical anxieties between states that in the past have been regional rivals. More immediately, the continuing presence of U.S. forces provides some

element of assurance to our allies—Japan and South Korea, and to Taiwan—as China and Russia enter a period of transition with incalculable consequences.

In Southeast Asia, the United States retains residual commitments to protecting the Philippines, although external threats to those islands are no longer readily apparent. With Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the United States shares the goal of ending Cambodian civil strife.

Aside from spillovers of possible future internal turmoil in China and the former USSR, the principal threats to U.S. interests in and from these regions remain the danger of conflict on the Korean peninsula, the participation of Asian states in nuclear weapon acquisition and delivery system programs inside and outside East Asia, and side effects from internal disputes in Southeast Asia. Among these threats, the North Korean nuclear program and the potential for China and North Korea assisting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery technology to the Middle East are perhaps the most immediate.

With the end of the Afghan war and the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations went the last obvious justifications for our decades' long strategic relationship with Pakistan, and with it the bases of direct U.S. interests in the Indian subcontinent. The last remaining acute U.S. concern may be inhibition of the Pakistani nuclear program and the continuing stasis of its Indian counterpart.

MIDDLE EAST

Now that the Cold War framework has collapsed, the United States is left with two major interests in the Middle East—ensuring supportive and stable Middle East oil suppliers and the survival of Israel. Less than ten million Gulf Arabs sit astride the world's most important petroleum deposits and control crucial financial assets globally. The unintimidated survival and cooperation of Gulf Arab governments is therefore important. Sentimental ties to Israel, the region's only democracy and a still significant if fading strategic asset, also seem important, at least politically. Both these interests seem protected from external threats for the moment, thanks to the success of the Gulf War. Unfortunately, the future regional peace and stability on which both may depend are hostage to the volatile politics of the region. Order and stability as we understand the terms may be beyond any institutional solutions the United States or the temporary Gulf coalition partners can devise. That judgment is exemplified by the Gulf Arab sheikdoms' reversion to type in the wake of the war and in the difficulties between Arab and Israeli parties at the bargaining table in what must be the most favorable of conditions since World War II.

If the specifically military threats to Israel are harder to identify now, external and internal threats to Arab governments are legion. Ideological, ethnographic, and religious differences among ruling oligarchies are compounded by perceived popular obligations to transnational causes ("Islam," "Palestine," "Arab" nationalism), by differences between states that are rich and underpopulated and others that are dirt poor or just less well off, by growing disputes over water, and by the lack of an acceptable political formula that reconciles traditional outlooks with the requirements of the modern world. If the precise form of future risks is not clearly visible now, it seems virtually certain that this poisonous stew could embroil U.S. forces in some way, once again. Short-term dangers include Iranian and perhaps Algerian and Libyan attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and the prospects of missile and launcher-technology upgrading in this region.

LATIN AMERICA

With the end of the confrontation with the former USSR, U.S. interests in Latin America seem more directed at fostering democracy and an attractive climate for U.S. investment, at reducing cocaine supplies, ensuring safe and efficient Canal operations, at protecting the ecosystem, at ensuring nuclear nonproliferation, at restraining Latin weapon suppliers from sales to the Middle East, and at providing for a secure common border with Mexican cooperation.

The centuries-long U.S. concern with extrahemispheric influences is less important now. The hemisphere's last communist stalwart, Cuba, is largely bereft of Russian support and represents little interest as a regional model. Nicaragua has had a change of regime, and the Farabundo Marti liberation front has achieved a tentative truce with the government of Salvador.

Although drug production and distribution restraint may require cooperative programs with Latin military and security services, the most significant threats to U.S. interests in Latin America are economic. These include the effects of the overall decline of the region's prospects, the flight of capital, and the unfortunate combination of local corruption and ineptitude with foreign indifference. In combination, these factors have increased the misery of large regions with growing populations, thereby increasing prospects for social unrest and reducing possibilities for cooperative solutions to problems of common interest, such as rain forest protection or reducing drug production.

AFRICA

The end of the Cold War has taken attention and resources from Africa, despite continuing desperate conditions of drought and famine. On the other hand, with the end of

donor interest, Cold War-influenced conflicts in the Horn and Angola have drawn to a close only to be replaced by conflicts based on tribal, religious, and grazing-land rivalries resulting in widespread famine. The outside world may confine its interest to alleviating the resulting suffering.

South African cohesion and the avoidance of civil war there represent U.S. humanitarian and domestic political interests, which can be supported by helping ensure continued international pressure for orderly negotiations among the major South African parties. Some have argued that continued unimpeded access to South Africa's mineral resources represents a U.S. security interest. Yet the multiple sources for most mineral products, the rising number of synthetics and substitutes, and the large strategic stockpiles maintained by the United States and other user states call this idea into question.

What may grow in Africa as the century wanes are the number of human and ecological rescue operations the international community undertakes on behalf of local victims and on its own behalf. If now-visible economic trends produce violent reactions, large-scale military rescues, such as the 1961 international effort in Zaire, may again be required. New types of rescue operations to save animal populations or rain forests could also be contemplated. More likely, the developed world may try to impede ecologically damaging behaviors by paying to avoid them.

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1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Much of the familiar context for military planning is gone. This is because of the diminution and more defensive configuration of "Soviet" forces east and west of the Urals, the decline of "Soviet" support for former clients, the apparent Russian disinclination to renew the East-West confrontations of the last four decades with the United States, and the collapse of the Soviet system. Once planners needed to contemplate a situation where almost any confrontation could escalate to a third world war. In the circumstances described above, the chances for such escalation are vastly diminished. Thus, the United States may have both greater freedom to initiate action and a decreased incentive for using armed forces. There is no more concern about a local brushfire bringing on global war when some local dispute is not resolved to U.S. or Soviet satisfaction; it should therefore be less possible for some party to the local conflict to involve either the United States or components of the former Soviet Union by suggesting some net loss in the "correlation of forces" or in the global influence of "freedom" or "socialism." And as Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated, international cover for military action is more possible and more attractive than heretofore. Furthermore, although most of our alliance relationships will continue in force, raising forces to meet all of them at once, or even several simultaneously, is less urgent than before.

It is unclear how a new world order can evolve from the postwar arrangements for the Middle East. If what emerges is some form of *Pax Americana* demonstrably based on the interests of the victorious Gulf coalition, those arrangements may not be as easily transferable to other disturbed parts of the world. Also, unless those arrangements reflect some incentive for continued compliance by all parties, they may not last. To qualify as a world order, the peace needs to be justified by some globally applicable norms of behavior. Moral imperatives, unfortunately, require consistent application. More practically stated, the United States needs to decide whether the UN charter commitment also commits and, thereby, also potentially limits U.S. action. To illustrate, without Security Council action, there may have been no Desert Storm Coalition; without SC Resolution 678, which authorized the use of forces, there may have been no congressional authorization to use force. Thus, the new U.S. administration may find itself in situations where the politics of the Security Council may limit American margins of maneuver.

Nevertheless, the classical incentives for conflict remain. Individual states will continue to worry about adequate security, territory, influence, resources, and the welfare of consanguineous populations outside their national territory or of fellow believers, and, in a few cases, will try to seize opportunities for righting perceived historical wrongs. Although few of such disputes raise issues of direct interest to the United States, some could involve calls for U.S. assistance by friendly countries or past U.S. clients, and others could involve U.S. facilities, American strategic interests, and the lives and property of Americans.

Other kinds of disturbances are certain to arise. Transnational or covert actors with fancied or real grievances will challenge recognized governments or call attention to their concerns by hostage taking, aircraft hijacking, and other unorthodox methods. Natural disasters (earthquakes, epidemics) or the man-made variety (Chernobyl, Bhopal) will require concerted international action in which the United States may perform a key or dominant role.

Beyond the need to prepare for war, U.S. forces outside the United States still have deterrence functions in Germany and Korea and a stabilizing job. The latter is, paradoxically, a function of inertia. That is, a sudden, abrupt, or massive change in the size and location of U.S. forces could affect perceived local balances in unexpected ways. For example, the departure of U.S. forces from the Panama Canal could be seen locally as a decline in U.S. interests in the region and evidence that local movements formerly inhibited by U.S. presence now have a freer hand. Thus, abrupt or capricious changes in U.S. forces could help bring on the very sorts of challenges to local stability that we would wish to avoid.

OBJECTIVE

The profound global and regional changes since 1989, including the sharp diminution of the global confrontation with the "USSR" and its former clients, suggest reexamining U.S. interests abroad and reexamining the threats to those interests, both globally and regionally. Such a reexamination is a necessary precursor to force planning for the 1990s and beyond.

This study is a preliminary qualitative attempt to identify generic global and regional U.S. interests, to suggest what threats to those interests remain, and to postulate additional future risks the United States might face that could have military implications.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

Section 2 takes a look at generic goals and threats. The remaining sections—3 through 9—examine seven regions of the World—Europe, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa—in terms of changes taking place, U.S. interests in the regions, and potential threats to those interests.

2. GENERIC GOALS AND THREATS

In this section, we examine generic goals and threats that affect the generation, size, and location of armed forces.

CHANGING GOALS AND FORCE GENERATION

The events of 1989 made U.S. strategic goals harder to identify and articulate than at any time in the past 40 years. The communist movement is in disarray, and its central concepts and prescriptions are largely discredited. The global threat it once represented is virtually gone. Thus, the *need to contain Soviet power*, the underlying strategic requirement of the past four decades, is much reduced. Even if Russia remains a major nuclear power and a large mobilization base, or if it becomes the locus of turmoil, it is no longer the wellspring of a global movement representing a different and actively competing view of the future, nor the leader of a massive alliance threatening the United States and its allies with overwhelming force or proxy wars.

On the contrary, the components of the former USSR seem to be trying to join the modern world. The Confederation of Independent States (CIS) has enough internal problems to ensure a high degree of self-absorption for the foreseeable future, as does Russia, although internal turmoil has inspired a sense of insecurity and some defensiveness. Indeed, the assets for internal modernization may be generated, to an important extent, at the expense of defense programs and the armed forces. "Soviet" forces are withdrawing from Europe. "Soviet" forces have shrunk and have been significantly reconfigured for increasingly important internal security and national unity roles. If there is an immediate problem, it is the fragmentation of this former nuclear power and disputes among its former constituent parts. Otherwise, even if the process of change generates new, more modern, and more capable Russian forces and continued modernization of strategic assets, reconstitution of an adversary global movement backed by Russian power is not a likely prospect. Most former Soviet clients have shifted with the prevailing winds. The few avowed Communist holdouts—Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea—can count on far less support than heretofore. And China, the other major communist nuclear power, is beset by internal resistance and needs good relations with the West to modernize.

Thus, the foremost strategic goals of the past few decades—*containing Soviet power and avoiding those confrontations with Soviet clients that could lead to a worldwide nuclear showdown with the USSR*—were overtaken by the events of 1989–1991. If possibilities of

military confrontation with either the components of the former USSR or China have not been eliminated, they are far less likely to emerge from Third World confrontations with their clients or allies.

Other security goals, however, remain constant. These include *defending the American people and U.S. territory and the approaches to the United States and its territories; defending American lives, installations, forces, and property overseas; and protecting American "interests" (as defined by the government)*. Many alliance relationships were built during the Cold War period for defense against the USSR, China, or their clients. To the extent that these purposes continue (e.g., Korea), forces will be needed to service them. Other alliances, like NATO, can be maintained with greatly reduced assets. Beyond existing alliance relationships, the defense of U.S. interests, lives, and property—largely overseas—are the goals most likely to generate forces for the future, notably expeditionary forces.

Global and regional stability become hard to define as policy goals once removed from the strategic nuclear or East-West contexts where the United States deters another global power or combination of powers for its own safety and that of its allies. *Stability* (not otherwise specified) has become a useful imprecision to hide agendas and justify policies or force levels. As used by politicians, stability sometimes appears as a synonym for uncertainty, as if the increased possibility of turmoil somewhere inevitably implies risk of wider conflagration ultimately involving the United States, either directly or as part of some international effort. Yet most local problems, even those that involve some fighting, normally die down or fester on without much more than occasional sympathetic attention from other governments, including ours. However desirable it may be, stability alone is not sufficient to justify raising and using U.S. forces, unless it is related to some identifiable U.S. interest.

Nevertheless, the United States would want to prevent local troubles from growing into regional problems involving major powers. That interest underpins the remaining presence missions of our military services. These missions are intended to provide timely reminders in many local situations that the United States is a present and, by inference, an interested potential player. By suggesting that the United States is a potential participant in such conflicts, that reminder is supposed to raise the potential costs of initiating conflict for local leaders in particular regions.

EVOLUTION OF GENERIC THREATS

Most opportunities for overseas operation may be at a considerable distance from the United States, notably in the Third World. Many Third World states have modernized their

forces to levels approximating European ones. Some, like India, Argentina, and Brazil, are important weapon-manufacturing states; others, like Iran, have armed forces with some experience of modern war.

Drawing on the U.S. goals outlined and qualified above, generic threats that *imply the use of force* involve:

- Attacks on U.S. citizens and their property;
- Attacks on U.S. allies or on U.S. installations in friendly countries;
- Threats to vital communication links, to freedom of navigation, or to access to vital resources;
- Dangers to regional stability (in some areas) or to the internal cohesion of important or friendly states.

These threat formulations reflect little more than restatements of standard peacetime requirements for armed forces, with the obvious caveat that threats can originate from unfriendly states or movements and can involve adversary armed forces or various kinds of irregulars, including terrorists.

The modern world also features several new threat forms, which include:

- Potential acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, or gas) by an unfriendly state or by an unstable movement or society;
- Violation, or potential violation, of important international norms by a state or group of states (e.g., potential ecological disaster or genocide).

Scenarios can be imagined under each of these headings. None of them implies massive forces of the sort needed for a global confrontation with a world power.

In addition to threats, a variety of essentially civil emergencies at home and abroad, such as nuclear or chemical plant accidents (e.g., Chernobyl or Bhopal) or outbreaks of disease, may require specialized forces, such as army hospital units and engineers.

For force-planning purposes, perhaps the worst case would be a full-scale confrontation with a well-armed, medium-sized power at some distance from the United States. Only the first heading (attacks on U.S. citizens and their property) clearly implies unilateral U.S. action. All the rest may require unilateral U.S. action, but might be performed in some international framework.

In a majority of cases, scenarios would involve a host country, allies, or a neighboring state in support of or in cooperation with U.S. forces. Thus, in a large number of potential cases, under each of these threats, U.S. forces may not have to carry all the military burden, nor operate without some local bases and other facilities. Nevertheless, the planning case for

force structure would presumably be the worst one, unilateral action with little time, and forcible entry, against a medium-sized power at a considerable *distance from the continental* United States. Ability to fulfill that task implies some ability to succeed at lesser expeditionary efforts.

3. EUROPE

CHANGES

The NATO alliance has provided security for more than four decades. NATO remains the most reliable security structure, because it represents partners with the greatest community of interest and with the capacity to support large-scale action. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty, the ongoing withdrawal to "Soviet" territory of "Soviet" forces, and the progressive collapse of communist legitimacy within the former USSR itself, the preeminence of Europe's security relationship with the United States erodes for most Europeans. European integration, local instabilities, selective Third World issues, and questions of trade predominate instead. Although a U.S. military presence remains welcome in Europe, the precise reasons for that welcome have become harder to express in terms that justify U.S. military deployments of some particular size or kind. A plausible nuclear counterweight of some kind to Russian power may still be needed, although it remains unclear whether that requires deployment of U.S. warheads on European soil or whether such deployment would even be tolerable once all "Soviet" forces have returned home.

The end of the Cold War means an end to the overlay of anticommunist ideology on strategy. The other ideological component of U.S. policy, espousal of democratic norms, is less of an issue in most of Europe than in other parts of the world. To compensate, there has been a rise in the importance of geo-economics. The European Community (EC) is now a major organizing vehicle for Europe's security, perhaps through its affiliate, the Western European Union (WEU), although exactly how remains unclear. Any new security architecture for Europe will come at the end of some process, rather than by imposition from some self-appointed group of architects. In any event, economic developments compounded by the revolution in telecommunications mean that the United States cannot retreat from Europe, even if it wishes to.¹

"Soviet" nuclear warheads will leave Europe with "Soviet" forces, suggesting that some form of the denuclearization long espoused by Moscow and supported by West European populations may not be far behind. We may end with primary reliance on strategic naval nuclear weapons for what remains of the extended deterrence mission. The latter may be the

¹Robert E. Hunter, "America's Role in New Security Architectures," *Adelphi Papers* 256, IISS London, Winter 90/91, pp. 112-113.

safest course for the long term with perhaps one modification. If we succeed in getting grudging German (and perhaps British and Italian) agreement to continued warhead storage beyond December 1994, that agreement is hostage to the next wave of domestic antinuclear sentiment. Once the "Soviets" are gone from German soil, there may be no tolerance left for storage of nuclear weapons. Some German analog to NATO's arrangements with Norway—which would allow the presence of nuclear-capable aircraft and their crews, would maintain the nuclear storage sites without the weapons, and would keep the communications and nuclear delivery mode training practices—may do just as well.

Some U.S. military presence in Europe is still needed whose size and composition is adequate to imply American intentions to return to face the least likely if still most dangerous threat—a Russian invasion of NATO territory. But there is an emerging consensus in the United States and Europe that the residual American presence will be far smaller than what was deployed in Europe when 1990 began. At a minimum, even a European defense identity of some kind would still need to rely on U.S. intelligence and logistic support, and would probably be unable to deal with a serious military threat from the East without U.S. help.

INTERESTS

U.S. interests in Europe are strategic, sentimental, ideological, and commercial. The American strategic interest in Europe is essentially the same as Britain's has been since the 17th century—preventing a vital landmass from falling under control of an unfriendly power or movement. Beyond that, North Atlantic cohesion, when representing the combined resources of Europe and North America, makes possible the necessary scale for constructive action to deal with the many concurrent revolutions that characterize the present era. The idea of North Atlantic cohesion, an American aspiration since the founding of NATO, presumes not only a preponderance or at least an adequacy of resources (and thus opportunity), but some global community of interest on which Atlantic partners are prepared to act.² It has not always worked that way; witness the differences in allied attitudes over Vietnam or over cooperation in Desert Storm.

Sentimental interests—the continuing emotional ties of a declining majority of the American population with individual European countries—are too well understood to require elaboration. These relationships sometimes bring particular issues to national attention in ways that distort domestic debate. Ireland and Greece/Turkey are familiar examples.

²Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, New York, Harper and Row, 1960, pp. 99–100.

American economic interests in Europe are large and still growing, although Europe has given way to the Pacific basin as the primary U.S. trading partner. Western and Eastern Europe together account for over 25 percent of U.S. trade, of which more than 97 percent is with Western Europe. Trade with both parts of Europe is growing rapidly, but it is growing more rapidly with Eastern Europe, as one might expect.³ Furthermore, most U.S. firms in international commerce and manufacturing maintain establishments in Europe to serve that relationship.

The ideological argument for close relations with Europe reflects the idea that liberty is indivisible, noting that most European countries are democracies and that most of the world's democracies are located in Europe. The ideological argument also asserts that the worthy identity of outlook fostered by democratic political institutions would wither in the "blight of dread" and therefore requires a climate of security.⁴

THREATS

There are five potential threats to European security that have some military implications and that are, therefore, potential threats to U.S. interests: (1) Russian fragmentation, or war on Soviet Territory with nuclear assets remaining in the hands of dissidents or in the hands of newly formed independent entities or movements (i.e., not under central control); (2) Russian incursions or pressures on western neighbors; (3) attempts by East European governments or populations to reclaim perceived national destinies, at each other's expense, or at the expense of former Soviet territory; (4) threats to European populations from outside Europe (missiles, terrorism, or externally induced ethnic minority turmoil within European countries); (5) population pressures from Eastern Europe and the Third World, stimulated by economic collapse. The last is the most immediate problem and does not seem amenable to military or arms control measures. The first four are discussed below.

Nuclear Weapons and the "Pieces of the Former USSR"

Much is made of the potential nuclear dangers flowing from disintegration of the former USSR. Many fear the emergence of irresponsible nuclear-armed new republics, or worse, nuclear weapons in the hands of shadowy movements whose goals and aspirations are

³For 1988, the last complete year for which published figures are available, 25 percent of U.S. World Trade was with all of Europe excluding the USSR, of which 97 percent was with Western Europe. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1990, pp. 806-807.

⁴Charles Burton Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1954, p. 87.

ill understood. Press reports and public statements by U.S. and Russian officials suggest that most of what matters in the former Soviet nuclear arsenal remains under central control. An exception may be short-range tactical nuclear warheads, like artillery.⁵ Another more important one may be the co-option of "Soviet" nuclear scientists and engineers by aspirant nuclear states.

Potential Russian Incursions

Any discussion of Russian incursions into Europe depends on scenarios that are hard to identify. One obvious possibility is inadvertent or deliberate "Soviet" delay in leaving Eastern Europe, including Germany, resulting in local incidents followed by some local retaliation and tensions between host governments and the former USSR. Another form of trouble from former Soviet territory may come from some reemergence of border disputes between East European states and *pieces* of the former USSR. Under the present heading, the first question is what can be done by those East European states that worry about a Russian invasion of some kind or about Russian threats to do so. Some of the obvious steps are being taken already. It is East Europeans who are holding the Russians to tight standards of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty compliance and who pressed for an end to residual Warsaw Treaty arrangements.

Presumably, the railway crossover points or choke points outside former Soviet territory where the railways change gauge, and on which much of Russian forward movement into Europe still depends, will no longer be readily available to Russian forces and can be sabotaged in the event of invasion. In addition, Polish airfields would not be available to Russian aircraft.

A more pertinent question is what if anything *outsiders* can do about East Europe's fears of Russian invasion. There have been many East European suggestions about the importance of a permanent U.S. presence in Europe and expressions of interest in more attention by NATO countries to Eastern problems. East European military officials have begun arranging exchanges and cooperative projects with NATO counterparts, and attempts are reportedly under way to produce weapons to Western specifications.⁶ Just how provocative these moves appear to Moscow remains to be seen. European NATO allies, notably Germany and France, are leery of NATO roles in protecting East Europeans. Across the Continent, there continues to be some, if declining, interest in a collective security system

⁵See "Loose Nukes," in *Defense Focus, National Journal*, March 3, 1990, p. 536.

⁶Christopher Smart, *Europe's Next Wars*, Hudson Institute Briefing Paper No. 126, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1990.

under a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) umbrella. That may be a useful if partial solution. Its value would depend crucially on the behavior of East Europeans themselves.

CSCE's usefulness as a security framework may be confined to providing rules and venues for discussion and information exchange, and a framework for the arms control process in Europe. It may also be useful for establishing norms for international behavior and machinery for mediation and dispute adjudication. If these attributes cannot guarantee security, they can help. For example, the information-exchange function will allow CFE participants to raise questions with respect to other states' force disposition, organization, activities, and, presumably, weapon acquisitions. The Russians and others will be required to answer to the satisfaction of foreign interlocutors or face challenge inspections and political consequences, including unfavorable public attention in the West. The norms of international usage the CSCE can potentially establish are even more important. One useful possibility concerns a general acceptance of European frontiers, meaning some general surrender of territorial claims by European states against the territories of other European states on the model of the arrangements between Germany and Poland. (Some, like Ireland, may balk.) Such a general formula would in the future confine the legitimate interests of states with respect to the mistreatment of consanguineous populations outside their own territories to human rights questions, at least legally. In other words, some formula recognizing all existing European frontiers would inhibit fancied or actual mistreatment of minorities abroad from reinforcing a territorial claim. This moves one step beyond the present CSCE formula, which allows for territorial change by peaceful means only. CSCE is also scheduled to become the framework for European arms control after 1992. This is the only way to avoid the absurdity of continuing to negotiate numerical parity in a situation without distinct blocs.⁷

Aside from the future form, coverage, and content of the nuclear umbrella, the residual American East-West political/military policy problem in Europe has two components: (1) whether military relationships of any kind between East European states and NATO countries will inspire the very Russian hostility those relationships are supposed to defend against; and (2) whether it is wise to increase the geographic circumscription of the area to be defended even as we cut the forces to defend that territory. Stated otherwise, do we want to double the area to be defended as we cut the forces that do the defending down to one-third their former size? This question may be amenable to some form of operations analysis. That

⁷Philip A. G. Sabin, "British Strategic Priorities in the 90s," *Adelphi Paper* 254, IISS 1990, p. 57.

could involve calculating days of warning and some range of Prepositioned Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) and Allied force readiness and availability assumptions versus estimates of the time required for reconstitution of Russian "fronts" capable of a Polish invasion. (The accompanying political scenario could be difficult to identify.) A more immediate policy problem is what East European states will rely on for national warning information beyond their own very limited resources or commercially available satellites. (How much and what kind of intelligence sharing, if any, could East Europeans count on, and with whom?) That is a subordinate question to the larger issue of the nature and kind of Western help for East European defense, if any.

Arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) could help. CFE I imposes limits on "Soviet forces." CFE IA limits active-duty personnel numbers for all participating states, including those on former Soviet territory, thereby making any covert mobilization effort longer and more cumbersome. Those limits, supported by inspection rights and information exchanges, add an important increment of attack warning. The eastward defensive orientation of the East European countries, and the opportunity for consultations with Western powers that increased warning provides, should help. As the most threatened parties, East European states will presumably press for stringent compliance and inspection standards for CFE I, and join with the United States and Britain in resisting any Russian proposals for the withdrawal of stationed forces in follow-on negotiations.

Reclaiming National Destinies in Eastern Europe

Polish independence is more than a theoretical question, since Poland disappeared from the map at least once each century for the past three centuries. In each case, she emerged with different frontiers. The other East European tribes have similar experiences and populations with long memories. Ethnic and religious differences in Eastern Europe are now specified frequently enough so as to no longer require detailed repetition. Essentially, Eastern Europe's frontiers separate consanguineous populations (e.g., Romania/Hungary, Slovakia/Hungary, Bulgaria) or unite distinct populations who are sometimes uncomfortable with each other for ethnic, religious, or historical reasons (e.g., Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia).

With the collapse of Europe's bipolar balance and the end of Soviet domination, a single international agenda for the region has been replaced by a dozen or more potentially conflicting "national" ones. One need only look at the imbroglios on former Yugoslav territory for the best examples. Otherwise, all East European governments are overwhelmed with largely economic domestic concerns and are eager to merit EC membership or at least

early association. Yet as has now become clear, this part of the world has histories of blind jingoism when internal unrest grows and economies fail. The problem could be most acute if the former USSR breaks up further, presenting territorial temptations. In that event, who would get Northern East Prussia? Would the Western Ukraine or Lithuania have the same frontiers with Poland? Who will protect Hungarians in Transylvania or Slovakia? One hopes that most difficulties in Eastern Europe will not involve actual conflict, and if they do, that conflict remains low-level and local.

The principal policy problems for the United States are to prevent: (1) imbriclios in Eastern Europe important enough to draw in outside states; and (2) situations where our interest in protecting the independence of any of these states involves us or our allies in supporting national agendas that reflect no identifiable American interests.

Threats from outside the regions are also bound to grow. In that respect, Desert Shield and Desert Storm could demonstrate to the satisfaction of large majorities that all but minor external problems may continue to require U.S. assistance.

Otherwise, our relations with Eastern Europe will be affected by individual national policies with respect to illicit technology transfer, and terrorism. Some of these concerns (notably technology transfer and support for terrorism) relate to possible residual relations between East European intelligence and internal security bodies or to individuals within those bodies and comparable Russian organizations. More and more, however, such worries should concern relationships between East European states and Third World countries. Although supplies to terrorists or training for terrorists may be largely eliminated, technology transfer or weapon sales to unfriendly governments in the Middle East or other trouble spots especially in Eastern Europe or on former Soviet territory cannot be excluded for the future. As Russian, other East European, and even domestic markets for shoddy consumer goods disappear, arms sales may become an overwhelming temptation, especially for regions with developed and locally dominant arms industries, like Slovakia.

Threats to Europe from Outside

Internal threats from alien guest populations or unassimilated residents, including terrorism, may rise. Aside from intelligence cooperation with European authorities, there are no obvious military approaches to these threats. They are military problems only to the extent that U.S. forces and installations have been and will be obvious targets. These are essentially internal security and police problems.

The emerging Third World missile threat is perhaps more manageable. U.S. policy goals include trying to keep that threat at present levels by ensuring no or very slow

improvements in missile accuracy and reliability, and in warhead technology. The most obvious approaches to achieving these goals seem to be a cooperative program with other developed nations of denying missile technology, active pursuit of nonproliferation goals, and some continued antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) research. The apparent success of the upgraded Patriot in the Gulf may rekindle interest in SDI-like "visions" of national defense against ballistic missiles in some West European countries, visions which could impose pernicious distortions on European defense budgets.

4. ASIA (NORTHEAST ASIA)

CHANGES

The global Communist collapse and the disintegration of Cold War confrontations in other parts of the world and their diminution in East Asia have altered the foundations of the post-WWII standoff in the Eastern rim of the Pacific. Yet the political change has not been as dramatic in Asia as elsewhere. If anything, almost all the remaining significant avowed Marxist states are located on or near the Pacific Rim. Nevertheless, significant changes have taken place.

- Policy shifts by the superpowers. These include Russian decisions to reduce forces opposite China and establish full diplomatic relations with South Korea, as well as hints of Russian flexibility on the return of four Northern Japanese Islands and the U.S. decision to open talks with Vietnam.
- Policy changes by major regional actors. These include normalization of relations between China and Indonesia and China and Vietnam and China and South Korea, greater Chinese cooperativeness (such as reduced support of the Khmer Rouge and rhetorical if lukewarm support of coalition actions in the Gulf), North Korea's proposal to open official ties with Japan, and Japan's decision to allow participation by Japanese self-defense forces to transport refugees caught in the Gulf War.
- Expanding dialogues between antagonists. These include dialogues between North/South Korea and Taiwan/China.

These changes reflect a diminution of specifically Cold War-related confrontations and a historic relative shift of economic power to the Pacific. They also suggest the possibility of some future Asian arms races. Among these, the most important, or at least the most immediate, is taking place on the Korean peninsula. Increasingly isolated from all her neighbors, North Korea has developed domestic weapon production and has become a significant exporter. Worse, North Korean cooperation with Iran in developing a longer-range and more accurate version of the Soviet Scud ballistic missile, the so-called Scud C, is perhaps the most dangerous example of Third World weapon-development cooperation. This phenomenon is important in itself and poses some danger on the Korean peninsula and to Northeast Asia. More significant, it is largely beyond the ability of the international community to influence or inhibit. Scud C, or its successors if there are any, could

presumably carry a variety of loads and could be deployed where sold, in the Middle East or elsewhere. For its part, the South Korean arms spending rate, more than four times the DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), suggests that it will surpass the North in weapon and equipment holdings by the middle of the decade.

Most pernicious has been the development of a North Korean nuclear program visibly oriented toward the production of nuclear weapons. Speculations about when the North Koreans could have a nuclear device vary from two to ten years. Both Korean governments have suggested arms control remedies to reduce the intensity of the confrontation on the peninsula, although so far the level of confidence between the Korean parties has been too low to permit much progress. Although the United States encourages better relations, confidence-building measures, and arms control efforts, and would be pleased to participate, the prospects for progress remain questionable. In the meantime, the confrontation on the Korean peninsula remains the most dangerous potential source of trouble in the region.

INTERESTS

U.S. interests in Asia are important and growing. They reflect history, geography, and the imperatives of economics. To an increasing extent, they also reflect the same kinds of emotional ties between Asian Americans and home countries in Asia that bind the United States to Europe. The opening of Japan and China in the middle and late 19th century, the acquisition of Pacific bases between 1857 and 1898, and the association with the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th century made the United States a contender for influence in Asia on a par with European powers. That role became almost inevitable by 1849, once the United States was clearly in possession of what is now the West Coast.

Economics

From the beginning, much American activity concerned the promotion of trade, which rose almost continuously from the mid-19th century, surpassing trade with any other part of the world, including Europe in the 1980s. At present, U.S. trade with Pacific Rim partners accounts for almost half of U.S. foreign trade; until the late 1960s, the United States had a positive balance of trade with most regional trading partners, a situation that changed gradually first in favor of Japan, and then also in favor of Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. By the early 1980s, the United States not only had a negative trade balance with these partners, it became a net debtor nation globally for the first time this century. If part of this transformation demonstrates the declining ability of national authorities to control economic activity increasingly dominated by large multinational corporations, much is also the result of Asian adaptability and enterprise.

Public blame for these changes and their economic consequences is ascribed overwhelmingly to the largest and most successful of our Asian partners, Japan. Indeed, a recent and authoritative public opinion survey lists "The Economic Power of Japan" as the greatest threat to U.S. "vital interests," well ahead of "Soviet military power" or the development of China as a world power—two other threat categories specifically identified.¹ This attitude reflects increasing self-doubt about U.S. abilities to compete internationally, well-publicized frustrations with Japanese success relative to U.S. performance, unhappiness with trade practices that inhibit U.S. exports (especially in the agricultural and construction sectors), the gradual loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs, and fears of foreign ownership. Ensuring that the political dialog about economic issues stays within tolerable bounds has become a prime factor in the U.S. security position in Northeast Asia. This is because our relationship with Japan remains the keystone of the American position in the Pacific. In this marriage of convenience, U.S. presence in force still underpins Japanese security in the face of a more ambiguous regional balance characterized by a possibly fragmenting Russia, a growing China, and a still dangerous Korean peninsula.

Security and Stability

Although the United States has been a Pacific power since the late 19th century, its victory in World War II and the wartime and postwar security arrangements ensured that the United States became the dominant military power in the Pacific. Challenges to that power, namely stalemate in the Korean War and defeat in Vietnam, have not fundamentally changed that situation. Even in the Cold War, Soviet forces in the Soviet Far East were more important as forces to be overcome in the event of war than as threats to U.S. territory or bases or as overwhelming local threats to U.S. allies. Soviet fleets, for example, would have had considerable trouble operating without air cover in open waters. Furthermore, for the 1960s and the first part of the 1970s, much of the Soviet force located in Asia existed to offset Chinese power, and Chinese power seemed increasingly taken with deterring Soviet threats.

The multilateral fabric of interwoven guarantees, pledges, and reassurances found in Europe does not exist in Northeast Asia (or in the Pacific Rim in general). The only security system consists of the bilateral relationships between individual countries and the United States. These are of particular importance for regional order because of the role they play in calming historical anxieties about the intentions of regional rivals and in facilitating peaceful

¹John E. Reilly (ed.), *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991, p. 20.

coexistence of erstwhile regional hegemonic nations such as China and Japan. Residual concerns about the military potential of Japan, for example, have arisen when Japan's neighbors criticized U.S. encouragement of increased Japanese military spending and development of a Japanese defense industry. Such criticism reflects fears that a combination of a more acerbic U.S./Japanese relationship and a growing Japanese defense industry could lead to a more independent and capable Japanese defense establishment sometime in the future.

Furthermore, there is considerably greater concern now in Northeast Asia than in Europe that regional conflict could break out. Although some initial steps have been taken toward reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, the need for U.S. guarantees remains. Without them, the regional states, including Russia, would presumably make their own arrangements. It is also possible that absent a U.S. presence and guarantee, both Japan and South Korea would wish to increase their military potential with respect to North Korea and, for that matter, each other.²

In some ways, U.S. *security* interests in Asia, at least for the Pacific Rim, parallel our interests in Europe. Briefly stated, these consist of denying any single power or combination of states domination within the region, ensuring unimpeded commercial and technical interchange within the Pacific between states not subject to coercion or threats of force, and seeking to maintain and increase incentives for regional states to collaborate with the United States. In addition, we encourage regional security cooperation based on common interests.³

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals apply especially to this region in several important ways. Clearly, the United States would not wish to see more nuclear powers emerge in the Pacific Rim itself. Specifically, the United States would be particularly reluctant to see North Korea, which has an active and apparently weapon-oriented nuclear program, become a nuclear power. The presumably related need to restrain South Korean interests in nuclear acquisition is also important.

The United States would also wish to restrain technologically sophisticated states in the Pacific Rim from exporting technologies to threshold nuclear states that can be used to upgrade warhead, delivery systems, or guidance technology. In this area, China, although now an intended NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) signatory, still has a nonproliferation record largely confined to generalized assurances about nontransfer of nuclear materials and

²Catherine Kelleher, "The Future Nature of U.S. Influence in Western Europe and Northeast Asia," *Survival*, July/August 1989, IISS, London, pp. 30-31.

³Jonathan D. Pollack and James A. Winnefeld, *U.S. Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific*, RAND, R-3933-USCINPAC, June 1990, and *A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim*, Report to Congress, DOD, April 1990, p. 6.

weapon-related technology. China is therefore of particular concern. This concern could sharpen now that supplier restraint has become important for the peace that follows Desert Storm. Supplier restraint is supposed to help inhibit states in the Middle East/South Asia region from acquiring reliable warhead technology or upgrading the accuracy and reliability of existing delivery systems to threaten each other or other regions like Europe. It should also allow slower and therefore cheaper and more orderly development of ATBM systems. Finally, the United States will presumably wish to keep any nuclear aspects of possible civil strife in China under review. This means keeping close watch on continuing central control over Chinese nuclear assets against the possibility that civil strife of the sort that erupted in 1989 would return in more virulent form.

Democracy

The Pacific Rim illustrates the tensions between democracy and stability, two avowed but sometimes inconsistent U.S. policy goals. Japan qualifies as a democratic country by common definitions. Many observers would argue that Korea, Singapore, and perhaps even Taiwan are moving toward a more democratic internal order. Yet the rate of movement in most East Asian countries seems uneven and slow. In South Korea, a large and vociferous student population, frustrated with generations of military rule, has spawned fringe groups with revisionist outlooks who prefer to blame the United States for the continued division of the country. U.S. policy is caught between pressing the Republic of Korea (ROK) to ease internal controls and the continuing need to support a government that still faces an implacable and well-armed Communist enemy to the north, but sometimes confuses internal opposition with subversion.

The long post-war confrontation with China ended in 1972, with U.S. recognition of Peking as the government of China. Between 1978 and the late 1980s, increasing Chinese opening to Western trade and toleration of Western contacts and especially China's continuing ideological and territorial differences with the USSR justified the warming relations that characterized the period. Yet China's avowed policy of "reform and openness" seemed to have generated much of the public support for the students who demonstrated for political reform in Tian An Men Square in 1989. U.S. public and especially congressional outrage with the subsequent suppression have made it difficult for U.S. administrations to continue the earlier intensity of relations and contacts with the Peking government. And China's continuing modernization of its strategic arsenal, its moves toward the developing of a blue water Navy, its missile sales to the Middle East, and its reported nuclear cooperation with Algeria and Iran do not inspire confidence.

Threats to U.S. Interests

Identifiable threats to U.S. interests in this region relate to contingencies involving behavior of regional actors in ways that could threaten the stability of the region.

Korea

If global containment of Communism or regional containment of "Soviet" or Chinese power no longer justifies U.S. presence in Korea, U.S. military presence *can still be explained* by historical obligation, by the character and behavior of the North Korean regime, and by the dangers that regime continues to pose to its Southern neighbor. Stated otherwise, if there were no U.S. presence in Korea, and no security guarantees, and if a hypothetical conflict were clearly confined only to the Northern and Southern regimes, no particular U.S. interest would be affected significantly over the long term.

However, North Korea, an intransigent Stalinist holdout, still represents a dangerous military confrontation to the ROK and to U.S. forces in South Korea. DPRK armed forces are still increasing in number and quality and are numerically superior in most measurable categories to those opposing them to the South. Sixty percent of North Korean ground forces are deployed close to the Demilitarized Zone separating the ROK and DPRK, with a particularly heavy concentration just north of Seoul.⁴ On the other hand, between 20 and 25 percent of North Korean gross national product (GNP) is allocated to defense, compared to just under 5 percent in the South. Nevertheless the military balance is moving in the ROK's favor; as calculated by expenditure (the South's budget is already 50 percent larger than that of the North). If present trends continue, the South may have achieved conventional military superiority by the end of the present decade.⁵ It may also be that the Gulf War has increased confidence in the South's military equipment (which comes from the United States), and that the North, which like Iraq had depended heavily on Soviet weapons, may be deeply concerned by the poor performance of Soviet weapons in the Gulf War. Finally, Pyongyang presumably doubts receiving Russian or even Chinese support should it attack the ROK. Perhaps in response, North Korea has developed a large and sophisticated indigenous arms industry and has become an increasingly important arms supplier, primarily to Middle East clients, including Iran.

There are reports that the North holds stocks of chemical weapons and is developing the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. The DPRK appears to be acquiring a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including unsafeguarded reprocessing facilities. Although the DPRK

⁴"Strategic Survey 1989-1990," IISS, London, p. 149.

⁵"Mission Accomplished in Korea," *Defense Monitor*, No. 2, 1990.

signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1985, there is still no full-scope safeguards agreement between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The DPRK has argued that U.S. nuclear weapons need to go, first, and that nuclear threats to the DPRK must end. The U.S. administration's announced willingness (October 23, 1991) to remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea and the ROK's stated willingness to see them go (November 7, 1991) do not seem to have helped much, so far. Progress in the development of nuclear weapons not only threatens the South, it renews ROK interest in nuclear weapons of its own, an effort the United States successfully discouraged in the mid-1980s. Worse, progress toward a DPRK nuclear weapon apparently invites thoughts of South Korean pre-emption. (On April 12, 1991, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong Koo suggested as much to journalists, later retracting the statement.⁶) Also, development of a North Korean weapon would severely damage global U.S. nonproliferation efforts, especially with respect to other threshold states. Finally, it is questionable whether Japan would tolerate a nuclear capability on the Korean peninsula without being tempted to produce weapons of its own.

Russia

No longer the adversary of the Cold War period, Russia apparently does not now regard the U.S./Japan security relationship as incompatible with the conclusion of a Russian/Japanese peace treaty. Furthermore, U.S. force withdrawals from Japan are no longer a precondition for any Russian concessions on the Southern Kuriles, although such concessions are not an immediate prospect.⁷ Actual Russian concessions on the Kuriles seem estopped by Russian fears that such concessions would somehow stimulate or justify territorial concessions to other neighbors or to peripheral populations. Also, Russian military disengagements have begun along the Sino-Russian border and in Mongolia; these withdrawals are consistent with the plans to reduce forces that Gorbachev announced in Peking May 17, 1989, when he said he intended to demilitarize the frontier with China. Those reductions announced plans to consolidate ground forces by 12 divisions, to disband 11 air forces regiments, and to remove 16 vessels from the Russian Pacific fleet. Gorbachev repeated plans for reductions in his visit to Japan in April 1991, adding intended plans for a partial withdrawal of the ten-thousand-person army division stationed there and of the 40 MiG 23 aircraft.⁸ Such moves, plus Russian withdrawals from Cam Ranh Bay and reduced Russian assistance to North Korea and Vietnam, should help alleviate if not entirely remove

⁶*The Economist*, April 20-26, 1991, p. 39.

⁷As reported in Sam Jameson's, *Aid Linked to 4 Islands, Japan Will Tell Soviets*, *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1991.

⁸*The Economist*, April 20-26, 1991, p. 31.

Japanese and other regional concerns about Russian intentions in Asia. Even so, Russia will continue to represent a cause for concern by virtue of its size, weight, nuclear arsenal, and the potential for trouble flowing from the former USSR's internal difficulties. Thus, even events of no particular Asian purpose, such as the stockpiling of heavy equipment withdrawn from Europe beyond the Urals, will be regarded with suspicion. For those same reasons, Northeast Asian countries may continue to find a visible U.S. force presence congenial.

China

China is an essential element in any regional balance and a significant potential military factor in a nuclear confrontation or in a regional war. It is worth noting that China is becoming an intercontinental nuclear power, in that it has built strategic submarines that at least in theory could be deployed within range of the United States.

China's military efforts are focused on the modernization and numerical reduction of ground forces and on the improvement of strategic, air, and naval forces. To the extent that they can be adduced, China's threat perceptions could reflect potential internal problems flowing from unrest in neighboring Soviet territory, from unhappy indigenous minorities, and from future problems relating to Hong Kong pacification. They could also reflect possible external confrontations with Vietnam, the Philippines, and/or Malaysia over the Spratleys and Paracels, not to mention continuing irritations with Vietnam, India, and perhaps Taiwan, and anxieties over perceived residual Russian or American hegemonial intentions and Japanese revanchism. Although China retains a strong interest in developments on the Korean peninsula, it has now established relations with the ROK. Thus the 1950s alliance with the DPRK seems to be somewhat in abeyance, at least to the extent that the DPRK could not count on Chinese support should it resume fighting.

China has been less than completely cooperative in nuclear and other weapon export matters. China was and remains one of the principal sources of arms and missile technology for Third World customers. It now ranks fifth in the world in the value of arms delivered to the Third World. Syria and Pakistan are suspected as the first customers of China's new generation of export missiles, currently designated M-9 (375-mile range) and M-11 (180-mile range). Both will reportedly be solid fueled and will be considerable improvements over their Scudlike predecessors. Nevertheless, the Chinese have become sensitive to Western criticism of its arms export policies. Repeated approaches by U.S. officials to the Chinese government inspire defensive responses about how China is not the only country to export missiles and how hard currency is necessary to finance China's conversions from military to civil production. Under U.S. pressure, the Chinese have reportedly said they would act

"prudently and responsibly" without specifying further what they meant. However, actual Chinese cooperation with the Missile Technology Control Regime seems questionable.⁹ China can be expected to upgrade its own arsenal in the wake of the Gulf War, including weapons it produces for sale abroad. Thus, states like Iran or Iraq could upgrade their respective arsenals over time outside the control of any supplier regime established in the wake of Desert Storm. China also has been suspected of assisting with nuclear programs of countries like Pakistan.

The United States could not ignore China's disputes with Taiwan, with the Philippines, with Vietnam over the Spratleys or Paracels, or with India over Ladakh should they break into open conflict. Some of these third parties would be sure to call on the United States, notably Taiwan, which has no other recourse. Others may be more inclined to also call for international assistance through UN action. In such cases, the United States could take a convenient position of principle because none of these disputes imply any threats to U.S. interests, absent evidence that China has some ambition to become a regional hegemonial power. Few identifiable disputes involving China with parties other than Japan, Korea, or Russia would actually involve U.S. security interests in any substantial way.

Japan

Those who worry about what the appropriate long-term Japanese security role should be usually ignore one unusual and potentially destabilizing factor. Japan, by turning over its security to another power from whom it is separated by a vast expanse of water, has done what few important countries in history have been willing to do—cede a meaningful portion of its own sovereignty inherent in the right of self-defense.¹⁰ Developments in Japan's external relations could inspire Japan to rethink its security arrangements. For example, serious differences with the United States could arise over economic issues. One could argue that such a process has already begun. The U.S. public's resentment over Japan's alleged free ride to prosperity under cover of an American security blanket is matched by a Japanese sense that the United States becomes more shrill, demanding, and unpleasant as its own economic competitiveness declines. If the older generation saw the United States in triumph and generosity, the present set of leaders sees us in repose and whining. If triumph in the Gulf reaffirmed some Japanese confidence in the quality of U.S. forces, the cause itself seemed less compelling in Japan. In fact, many Japanese felt no compulsion to be defended

⁹See George Leopold, "China Markets Missiles to Middle East Buyers," *Defense News*, April 8, 1991.

¹⁰William Watts, *The United States and Japan: A Troubled Partnership*, Ballinger, New York, 1984, pp. 101-102.

from the likes of Saddam Hussein, being confident of their ability to deal with governments who must sell oil to survive. More fundamentally, Japanese resentment over being asked to pay for whatever benefits they may accrue from the war is exacerbated by major concurrent U.S. debt forgiveness (to Poland, Israel, and Egypt). These decisions were made for U.S. policy reasons with which many Japanese disagree and about which Japan was not consulted.¹¹ If such disputes continue to spill over into the political arena where U.S. and Japanese politicians find it convenient to posture publicly at each other's expense, a new generation of Japanese voters, slightly contemptuous of U.S. economic performance and unfamiliar with World War II, could gradually be irritated into a reconsideration of Japan's security arrangements. Even if the security relationship survives for lack of a viable alternative, the process of mutual irritation may erode much of its mutual value long before it ends.

How long such a process would take depends on complex Japanese cost/benefit calculations with respect to the existing arrangements with the United States—and on U.S. behavior. Japanese threat perceptions are one obvious factor in any future policy change. U.S. pressures for the Japanese to do more, pay more, raise larger forces, and become more active are obviously another. Americans pushing the Japanese self-defense forces into more active roles or the Japanese government into greater financial contributions should be clear in each instance about exactly what common interest such increments serve. Unless they are clear on this, U.S. pressure may hasten the day when the Japanese feel impelled to do without U.S. support. In April 1991, one-third of Japanese voters, 11 percent more than in 1990, favored revising the constitution toward greater independence of military action. The ascribed reason was "because the constitution was forced on Japan by the United States."¹² For that matter, some classes of short-term threats could accelerate independent Japanese action. It is, for example, possible that unambiguous evidence of Korean nuclear weapon acquisition could inspire reactive moves in Japan to produce a Japanese bomb.

¹¹Richard Reeves, "Japan Has Had It as the World's Cash Cow," *Los Angeles Times*, April 21, 1991.

¹²Sam Jameson, "Fewer Japanese Now Back the Constitution," *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1991.

5. SOUTHEAST ASIA

CHANGES

The end of the Cold War in Europe had echoes in Southeast Asia. No longer bent on competing with the United States in the Third World, the former USSR withdrew from Cam Ranh Bay and opted to press its client among the four Cambodian factions, the Heng Samrin government, to cooperate with proposed UN solutions. These moves made it possible for China to modify its support for its Cambodian clients—Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge—thereby preparing the way for compliance with a UN solution calling for a provisional government once the Cambodian factions themselves can agree on the details of implementation. The end of the Cold War and Russian departure from Cam Ranh Bay lowered somewhat the strategic value of the remaining U.S./Philippine bases opposite Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam, even as the Philippine senate voted the navy out of Subic Bay. Yet the apparent diminution of the U.S. military profile in Southeast Asia may have raised some local anxieties in Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, for example, about whether and how far the United States intended to withdraw.

Eighteen years after the Indochina War, the Communist governments in Vietnam and Laos continue to face severe economic difficulties. These, like other former Soviet clients, have been notified about the reduced Russian materiel support and about the necessity of paying hard currency for most Russian materiel, including oil, in the future. There is, however, nothing available to replace "Soviet" aid, short of massive foreign investment. Still Marxist holdouts, both countries seem unlikely to attract much Western assistance, absent some visible moves toward open markets as the West defines them. Relations between Vietnam and China have improved somewhat without becoming warm.

Although still under military rule, Thailand continues to prosper and industrialize faster than all its neighbors. Burma (now Myanmar) remains unable to shake an unpopular military government or end chronic rebellions by Karens, Kachins, Shans, and other autonomy-seeking minorities. Opium growing and smuggling and heroin processing remain problems in Northeast Thailand, Burma, and Laos, apparently beyond the ability of local authorities to control, assuming that they are so inclined. Indonesia remains stable, although its fundamental problems—Javanese overpopulation, Moslem fundamentalism and separatism in Northern Sumatra, a visible end to exportable quantities of petroleum, and no obvious political successor to the aging Suharto—all suggest trouble ahead. So do increasing

Moslem/Malay assumptions of privilege at the expense of the large and prosperous Chinese minority in Malaysia.

The Philippines remains in difficulty. The government still faces insurrections from within the armed forces by factions convinced that military rule would be cleaner and more effective than democracy—and from other groups in regions where the government's writ does not run evenly, like parts of Mindanao. Some of these insurrections press for regional autonomy, like Mindanao's Moslems. Others, like the sometimes Chinese-inspired left-wing National People's Army (NPA), want to change the patterns of land ownership. The government lacks the resources to deal effectively with either the rebellions themselves or with the root causes. The Filipinos, who had the second highest per capita income in Asia in 1965, are now in difficult economic straits. They need someone besides themselves to blame for their indifferent relative economic performance. Not surprisingly, some Filipino politicians, notably in the senate, find it convenient to blame the United States for many of the country's ills. Yet now that the Air Force and Navy have left, whom they blame matters a great deal less.

INTERESTS AND THREATS

Good bilateral relations with the states of the region, freedom of peaceful transit and navigation through straits and narrow seas, increased peaceful commerce and an absence of conflict all qualify as U.S. interests. Revival of piracy to levels that require military attention, hostage situations, mass refugee movements, or official interference with peaceful passage of vessels seem like the only obvious justifications for the use or threat of lethal force. Conceivably, the Golden Triangle drug producers might also become drug war targets in some form.

Strategic U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are hard to identify, now that the rivalry with the former USSR is greatly reduced and communism no longer provides working models that charm younger generations of Asians. Survival of Communist-labeled rebellions in places like the Philippines have more to do with local perceptions of social justice and the strong desire for change than with some interest in emulating specific models in China, Vietnam, or the former USSR. What we mean by regional stability in Southeast Asia may be as hard to define as why we would care enough about events there to fight.

The United States *would* presumably wish to avoid situations where another large power became embroiled. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that the United States would become involved in some skirmish between Vietnam and China. If the Taiwan situation is more ambiguous, Taiwan no longer commands the interest and attention it did during the

Cold War. Actual decisions to participate in a conflict may be determined by considerations broader than U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, such as the views of allies like Australia. Based on interests in the region itself, it is hard to imagine internal or bilateral conflict situations in Southeast Asia *among local parties* that would be compelling enough to stimulate U.S. military participation. A Philippine insurrection where the government calls for U.S. assistance may still be an exception. Obviously, U.S. concern for the sufferings and other unintended consequences of local warfare would ensure some nonlethal participation in the wake of a local conflict.

Nevertheless, U.S. forces still have amorphous but appreciated stabilizing functions with respect to this region. Sudden abrupt or massive change in the size and location of U.S. forces could affect perceived local balances in unexpected ways by indicating a decline in U.S. interest. Most local governments tend to welcome some continued visible U.S. military presence.

6. SOUTHWEST ASIA (SUBCONTINENT)

CHANGES

Soviet departure from Afghanistan (the last Soviet trooper left on February 15, 1989) was followed by Mujaheddin defeat of Najibullah's government. A stalemate between factions among the increasingly fractionalized Mujaheddin element continues, with the Mujaheddin badly divided by linguistic background (Pushtun or Farsi), regional origin, and external support (Pakistani, Iranian, or Saudi). Most observers underestimated the strength of centripetal forces. Afghanistan could easily revert to a collection of loosely linked, occasionally brawling semifeudal fiefdoms. Because there has been no negotiated settlement, over three million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan, an increasingly unwelcome group causing growing local costs.¹

The years of war also reestablished large-scale drug cultivation and trade in the "Tribal Belt" on both sides of the Afghan/Pakistan frontier. Locally produced poppies are sold through networks that benefit from the collusion of local authorities, some of them Mujaheddin factions. Drug cultivation and trade has apparently grown beyond the control of regionally interested governments, not only Afghan and Pakistani but also Iranian and Russian.

U.S. aid (a \$4.02 billion total package) was suspended in 1990, as the law requires, when President Bush could no longer certify that Pakistan remained a nonnuclear weapon state. With the virtual end of the Cold War, the remaining important U.S./Pakistani bilateral effort (Mujaheddin support) became an abrasive and unresolved problem rather than an inspiring common cause and ended in 1991. Relations between Pakistan and India, never good, are growing worse, once again because of Kashmir. Local anti-Indian agitation, whether actually or ostensibly for independence or overtly for union with Pakistan, has subjected both governments to strong domestic pressures to be tough in this high-visibility dispute, which goes back to 1947. Pakistan, which denies any involvement in the uprisings, continues to press for a UN-sponsored plebiscite, still rejected by India out of concern about how Kashmir's Moslem majority would vote.

The USSR was and Russia remains India's principal arms supplier and a partner in several weapon coproduction schemes. Until near the end of the Cold War, this relationship provided some of the rationale for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. That justification is

¹"Strategic Survey 1989-1990," IISS, London, p. 159.

all but gone. If India is still more of a Russian arms client than a U.S. one, it has reached for arms diversification. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the lessons of the Gulf War about the relative merits of U.S. and Soviet weapons will be entirely lost on the General Staff in Delhi. Nevertheless, Indian cooperation in refueling coalition military aircraft for the Gulf War proved so unpopular that the government was constrained to end this cooperation with the United States. Finally, economic difficulties notwithstanding, Indian leaders remain interested in becoming an important regional power in Asia and in remaining the dominant military power on the subcontinent.

Beset with growing political problems between the Congress party and other parties, with population growth still out of control, with religious strife between Hindus and Moslems and between secular Delhi and Sikh nationalists, and with two Indian states under emergency direct rule from Delhi, India might be expected to look inward; nonetheless, Indian leaders remain concerned about developments in Pakistan, about India's own prestige abroad (including its position in Asia relative to China), and about the continuing Sri Lankan civil strife next door. Anxiety about Pakistani support for Kashmir separatists is only the most acute of India's external troubles. Pakistan's reported intent to acquire solid-fueled rocketry from China is also particularly bad news, coming hard upon confirmation of India's worst fears of Pakistan's nuclear intentions.

INTERESTS AND THREATS

Pakistan was a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) power, a conduit to Peking when there were no relations with China, a counterweight to a less friendly India mired in Bandung rhetoric, a strategic asset opposite Soviet Central Asia, and an essential partner in sustaining the Afghan resistance against Soviet invasion. In recognition, the United States became a prime lender and donor and Pakistan's major supplier of military equipment. None of these roles are of much importance any longer, a factor which made it easier for the Bush administration to cut aid as the law requires, in response to Pakistan's apparent acquisition of some nuclear weapon capability. This step was only the latest chapter in an almost two-decade long U.S. effort to inhibit a Pakistan nuclear weapon program apparently begun in the early 1970s under General Bhutto's government.

India's test of a "device" in 1974 left India as an unavowed but generally acknowledged nuclear state. This ambiguous status seemed designed to warn Pakistan against doing the same, to balance China's arsenal (at least to the extent of showing that India had the capacity to become a nuclear power), and to demonstrate that there was more to India's self-ascribed potential great power status than mere posturing. Pakistan's emergence as a

clearly identified threshold state could change perceptions of balance in the region and beyond. For some Moslem states, including perhaps Libya and Saudi Arabia (which reportedly supported the Pakistani effort), Pakistan's weapon would have value as an "Islamic" bomb, a symbolic statement of equality for "Islam." The United States, Britain, and Russia, the principal supporters of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, are appalled. The test of policy and the primary U.S. interest now seem to be whether the emerging nuclear standoff on the subcontinent can be limited to present levels. If Pakistan has no interest in actually exploding a nuclear device (which could inspire more public testing by India), it continues to have every incentive to acquire missile technology and to maintain its 50-odd F-16s. It may be possible to inhibit Pakistani acquisition of missile technology by finding a way to make limited quantities of aircraft spares available.

In short, the current overriding U.S. security interest on the Indian subcontinent is to shore up the global nonproliferation regime by preventing further escalation of nuclear competition on the subcontinent. Unfortunately, there are few acceptable military options that would support preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and of the missile technologies that improve range reliability and accuracy. Furthermore, past experience with the Pakistani program gives little hope that the history can be reversed. Otherwise, another Indo-Pakistani war over an issue like Kashmir would be deplored, rather than ignored, but seems unlikely to involve U.S. forces.

7. MIDDLE EAST (ARABS, ISRAEL, IRAN, TURKEY)

Since the end of World War II, the Cold War provided the primary organizing framework for U.S. policy in this region. The other two main props have been the supportive and stable relations with Middle East oil suppliers and helping ensure the survival of Israel.

CHANGES

End of the Cold War

The transformation in relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union (e.g., bilateral and multilateral cooperation in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, statements about ending concessionary arms agreements with clients such as Syria, and warming of Soviet relations with Israel) was essential to the coalition politics that made the Desert Storm victory possible. Thus, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, containment of "Soviet" influence is no longer a primary U.S. objective. There may be global or regional issues or considerations that justify U.S./Russian competition in particular cases. Nevertheless, under foreseeable circumstances, that competition seems unlikely to be great or long sustained, at least not in the Middle East. Thus, the need for the United States to expend effort and treasure to balance Russian influence and Russian presence in this region is much reduced, as is the danger that Middle East crises could escalate to confrontations with Russia and to intercontinental nuclear war.

Nevertheless, Russia will wish to retain influence in the region; to that end, it will adopt positions that differ from those of the United States, but those differences may often not be greater than those assumed by France or India and should become part of the normal diplomatic process. It may also be that a permanent U.S. military presence of any size could inspire Russian suspicions about longer-term U.S. intentions to establish a regional presence at least partially directed at Russia herself. Also, there are limits to visible Russian cooperation with the United States against Moslem powers. Russia has large and increasingly restive Moslem populations of its own, and important moslem neighbors in Central Asia. Their attitudes will require more accommodation now, than they formerly did. Nevertheless, there should be a high degree of agreement on the fundamental goal of long-term regional stability. After all, regional stability, meaning an absence of conflict in the Middle East, represents an important form of local stability for Russia herself.

The Gulf Oil States

Close and continuing relations with Middle East oil suppliers remain an important U.S. policy. Since before the end of World War II, the United States has been the partner and ultimately the successor of Britain in protecting and otherwise assisting Gulf oil producers. Beginning in 1943, with the Tehran conference and Roosevelt's subsequent visit to Saudi Arabia, the United States has worked to ensure adequate and secure supplies of Gulf oil at reasonable prices. Successive U.S. governments have pursued influence with Saudi Arabia, with Gulf sheikdoms, and even after 1979, with Iran. Technical assistance, arms sales, training, uncritical political support, and occasional military protection were the instruments of influence. Increasing webs of commercial and financial relationships between Gulf oil states and American firms and institutions ensured reciprocal Gulf Arab influence in the United States. Until 1979, when the Shah was overthrown, several U.S. administrations regarded Iran as a surrogate protector of the Gulf against Soviet influence and the influence of perceived Soviet clients, such as Iraq. Thereafter, until the Iran/Iraq war was over, the U.S. responded to revolutionary Iran's virulently anti-American posturing by tilting toward Iraq in its quarrels with Iran, at least much of the time.

As did Britain in an earlier day, successive U.S. administrations made clear that threats to the security of Gulf states implied trouble. In support of this warning, the United States kept a naval task force in the Gulf for 40 years and created a separate ("Central") command to coordinate and plan contingency military operations in the Gulf. In the Iran/Iraq war, the United States inspired and provided the largest element of a multinational naval task force that kept open the flow of oil from the Gulf and reflagged Kuwaiti tankers with American colors for added protection. The end of the Iran/Iraq war in 1988 diminished Iran's resources considerably, ending, at least for a time, that country's ability to project power beyond its frontiers. Finally, with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States, with Arab and European help, succeeded in preventing an obviously intended change in the regional balance of power in favor of Iraq. The victory in the Gulf could not have happened without U.S. strength and leadership, but it was also the result of the legitimacy that the international community conferred to a use of force that may otherwise have been politically untenable and financially much more onerous.

Israel

The United States was among the first to recognize the state of Israel in 1948 and has supported Israeli independence ever since. Generating domestic political support for Israel from 1948 through the 1973 war, the last war that featured a general Arab attack on Israel,

proved politically possible although by no means cost free. U.S. support for Israel generated large anti-American publics in the streets of most Arab capitals. Furthermore, U.S. support for Israel facilitated Soviet penetration of the Middle East. After the 1956 overthrow of Farouk in Egypt and of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq in 1958, the USSR became the champion of what it termed the more progressive Arab states (i.e., those that had overthrown traditional rulers). Thus, the USSR supported the pan-Arab and Palestinian side in the quarrel with Israel. Soviet assistance took the form of military training and materiel, training of national and Palestinian cadres, economic and technical assistance, and Soviet/Warsaw Pact diplomatic support for Arab positions. Controlling the exodus of the Soviet Jewish population was another implicit lever over the behavior of some Arab governments.

Soviet clients in the Arab world consisted largely of states with limited resources and poorer populations more attuned to the promise of utopias and the nobility and urgency of external causes, although the USSR also welcomed cooperation from states like Iraq, Libya, and Algeria that were attempting to rid themselves of Western influence. For these countries, Soviet assistance also represented an opportunity to acquire arms against internal threats and unreliable neighbors, including Israel. Of transcendental causes, Arab nationalism—the sense that the Arabic speaking world was somehow a single community of fate, which even Arab oil states found hard to avoid espousing—was the most significant and pervasive. The pan-Arab movement identified all Arab states and former Mandate Palestine as Arab land while concurrently fostering Palestinian nationalism. Islam, in its more fundamental forms, seems to have become an important supplement.

Nevertheless, the United States remained a major influence in the Arab world. This was because of long-standing U.S. ties with the oil states, on whose generosity or anxieties most of the other Arab governments depended for subventions. U.S. influence also reflected U.S. global preeminence in a large number of fields and presumed U.S. influence with Israel. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when it became clear that Israel was likely to survive, some Arab governments began hoping that the United States might influence Israeli thinking to return Arab lands seized in that war.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war ended Egyptian military supply dependence on the USSR. Its most important longer-term result was the 1979 peace between Israel and Egypt initiated by former Egyptian president Anwar al Sadat and brokered by President Carter at Camp David. By this stroke, significant "Arab" land (the Sinai) was returned to Egypt. Also, the militarily most significant Arab state, Egypt, left the coalition against Israel. In the period after that war, American military and economic assistance to Israel and Egypt rose to some

three billion dollars a year for Israel and greater than 2 billion dollars a year for Egypt. U.S. cooperation with Israel increased to include initiation of common weapon programs for fighter aircraft and electronic components and ATBMs. Furthermore, Israel provided intelligence cooperation and land for construction of transmitters beamed at the USSR. Although no formal alliance was concluded, former Defense Secretary Weinberger characterized U.S.-Israeli relations as a strategic relationship. Nevertheless, there were (and remain) important bilateral irritations.

For one, the simultaneous progress on Palestinian rights also mandated at Camp David failed to materialize. The land-for-peace trade-offs, which some Americans (and many Arabs) had hoped for in the wake of Camp David, never came. What came instead was an apparent Israeli policy to settle the West Bank of the Jordan with Israeli settlers, despite repeated protests from indigenous Palestinians, Arab governments, European embassies, and American administrations. And in 1982, to end attacks and terrorism originating with elements of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon, the Israeli Army invaded that country to expel the Palestinians and later withdrew, a catalytic event toward the subsequent Lebanese civil war.

Since 1987, clashes between young Palestinians (the Intefada) and Israeli forces have appeared on global television. These have poisoned relations between Arabs and Israelis within Israeli territory and in the occupied lands. Along with television images of the invasion of Lebanon, these clashes have changed the image of Israel in Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and the United States from that of a small potential victim of hostile neighbors to that of an oppressive colonial power. Divisions within Israel about whether or not to continue settling the West Bank now that Soviet Jews are arriving in large numbers and about whether territory can be ceded at all inhibit progress toward a solution. Nevertheless, the 1992 change of government in Israel made clear that there was a majority in Israel that favored serious negotiation. Thus the peace process begun in Madrid in early 1992, and followed by Washington conversations between Israel and delegations representing the Palestinians, Syria, and Jordan, provide some hope for progress. If the Arabs expect territorial concessions, the Israelis want peace, not just land for paper. Even with greater good will than heretofore, the road ahead is probably long.

The Post-Desert Storm Environment

Thanks to its preponderant role in the Desert Storm victory, the United States became the most influential if not the dominant external power in the Middle East. Circumstances at the end of the war suggested opportunities for resolving many of the Middle East's chronic

problems or for at least addressing and managing them better. Russia if not an ally, is not clearly an opponent. Furthermore, unlike in the past, there are no obvious "Soviet" surrogates to strengthen or support any Russian opposition to U.S. initiatives. Both Israel and the United States now have interests in better relations with Russia—the United States for global and strategic reasons and Israel to ensure an uninhibited inflow of Russian Jews.

Iraq and Iran are militarily and economically exhausted, although Iran seems to be recovering at a faster rate, thanks in part to Desert Storm. Both will lack power projection capabilities for the foreseeable future and, therefore, will pose only potential military threats to their weaker neighbors. The authority of Iran's Shiite clergy continues to pose some political risks for the stability of several Gulf states. And Iraq's fragile cohesion suggests some future internal realignment. By participating in the coalition against Iraq, Egypt and Syria have become the dominant Arab military powers although they have failed to become the future guardians of local "stability" under authority of the Arab League, as earlier anticipated. After decades of virtual inactivity, Turkey is again taking a more active interest in the lands beyond its southern borders, notably against parts of northern Iraq, if only to ensure that no independent state emerges to entice Turkey's Kurds and those of neighboring Iran with examples of territorial independence.

Desert Storm left Israel, a suspected nuclear state, as arguably the strongest regional military power. This perception has not escaped Israel's neighbors. Allied gratitude for Israeli forbearance during Iraqi missile attacks may be offset by the realization that Desert Storm was a great boon for Israel. It helped Israel by bringing about the diminution of Iraq, the only regional state that had been credited with the ability to challenge Israel militarily. And with the wind-down of the Cold War, the erstwhile U.S./Israel "strategic relationship" may matter less to the United States than it did in the period of U.S./Soviet confrontation.

The post-Gulf War period has highlighted the Arab/Israel conflict and with it the Palestinian issue as the most prominent remaining regional question. "Palestine" has been one of the formative issues in Arab politics for most of this century. Failure to address it seriously now would cause no end of trouble, even if actually addressing it proves as fruitless as heretofore. Until the Palestinians and their discontents are seriously considered by all potential parties, including the United States, Palestine will remain a central feature of Arab politics to the detriment of more vital and difficult considerations about modernization, economic equalization, overpopulation, scarce resources, cooperation, and democracy.

The key operational elements of the Palestinian question seem to be territorial and political ones. The territorial element focuses on whether secure borders can be achieved if Israel would release or change the status of any, or any parts, of the territories captured in

the 1967 war. In exchange, Israel would receive settlements with its neighbors analogous to those with Egypt and ultimately better relations with all Arab states. Those territories are the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan river, and East Jerusalem. By political elements, we mean the nature and powers of any Palestinian entity that emerges from negotiations. Possibilities mentioned by interested parties include an independent state, some form of federation or confederation with Jordan, something less than statehood called "autonomy," and UN trusteeship as an intermediate step.

Chances to try some solution seem better than they have in years. Israel's historical counterargument (that as a small, vulnerable state surrounded by larger and better-armed enemies, it must hold on to the territories because it needs strategic space) is threadbare. There is no combination of Arab states that could challenge Israel militarily now. And few if any seem so inclined, except perhaps rhetorically. Iraq is focused on internal security and Gulf War follow-on issues for the foreseeable future, and Syria, never a match for Israel by itself, is now negotiating. Thanks to its miscalculations in supporting Iraq in the Gulf war, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership, and by extension the PLO itself, has lost Gulf state support. The organization seems more discredited than at any time in the past.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian issue will not go away. Abuse of Palestinian civilians by Kuwaitis, continued complaints about Israeli behavior in the occupied territories, and the increasing plight of refugees now denied Saudi and other Gulf Arab subventions seem certain to keep the Palestinian issue alive in the West and in the Arab world. This is why the Washington negotiations are so important. Failure to respond would have exposed the United States to accusations of hypocrisy and bad faith in the Arab world, thereby eroding the credibility and prestige gained through the Desert Storm victory. And failure to make some progress toward Arab goals would strengthen those non-PLO Palestinian movements that are even more unbending and violent than the more extreme PLO factions have been. These include the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Hamas, the growing Moslem fundamentalist movement in the occupied territories.

U.S. INTERESTS

Peace and "Stability"

Peace has replaced containing the USSR as the principal U.S. interest in the Middle East. It is presumably an interest that Russia in its present political configuration shares. Ideally, peace should mean stability, some orderly pattern of local relations based on common

civility, and a habitual preference of negotiated solutions to disputes. A more realistic goal may be a situation where:

- No regional state is sure enough of military triumph to risk initiating war with any of its neighbors;
- Regional coalitions for mayhem are inhibited by prospects of meaningful international sanctions;
- Unorthodox surrogates for national action or popular frustration (e.g., terrorists) get much less national support than they now enjoy.

The post-Desert Storm period provides an opportunity for the victorious coalition to organize a settlement that is more stable than the situation that preceded it. Announced U.S. plans for a more stable region feature four simultaneous goals: Arab/Israeli peace arrangements, security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, regional arms control pacts, and economic development.¹ Of these, the most advanced seems to be the peace process, itself at a very early and difficult stage.

Oil

Much of the industrialized world will continue to depend on the stable supply of Persian Gulf oil into the next century. U.S. interest in Gulf oil relates primarily to the continued availability to the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states of an ensured petroleum supply at a stable and reasonable price from the world's major proven source. Strategies for safeguarding that interest include relying on the economic self-interest even of "unfriendly" regimes for stability of oil supply (where a key threat to stability of supply is monopolistic control, even by "friendly" regimes), preventing regional hegemony (external threats to major Gulf producers), preventing (if possible) internal threats to moderate oil producer regimes, and maintaining stable access to Gulf oil through promotion of regional stability. These strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Whether the prospect of interrupted oil flows from the Middle East actually threatens the security of Europe or Japan, the area's principal customers (let alone the United States), has not been clearly established. Japan seems to be shifting to greater emphasis on nuclear power. For its part, the United States remains less than 10 percent dependent on Gulf oil. First, there is no historical evidence of effective resource denial by one party to a dispute, especially if that resource is the denying party's sole source of income. Second, the scenario

¹Secretary of State James Baker to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, as reported in "Saudi King Fahd Agrees to Support New U.S. Efforts for Mideast Peace," *Los Angeles Times*, March 14, 1991.

that actually results in a complete denial of Middle East oil implies a degree of sustained unity of purpose among normally antagonistic players that has never before been achieved and is therefore difficult to imagine. Third, Europe and Japan are presumably mature and aware enough of external events to ensure alternative oil stocks and supplies, if these seem threatened.

Security of Gulf Arabs

The Gulf Arab states together account for slightly more than ten million people, but they have most of the world's proven oil, and they are too weak to defend themselves alone. Beyond ensuring the availability of oil and the stability of oil prices are the economic and political effects that enormous oil earnings and investments make possible. Kuwait alone is credited with external investments between \$70 billion and \$100 billion. Gulf Arab earnings affect the Middle East itself and the world outside. Petroleum earnings can be used to increase the quality of local life, to affect major capital flow and investment decisions abroad, to support or destabilize local regimes or governments farther afield, to buy off or otherwise influence neighboring governments or populations, to increase the respectability of some world view congenial to the donor, to increase perceived national security by purchasing weapons, and to buy favorable publicity.

To illustrate, Kuwait had model social services before the Iraqi invasion, helped end the 1956 Suez crisis by threatening London with the withdrawal of national deposits from the Bank of England, helped Iraq with the war against Iran and the PLO against Israel, and (before Desert Shield) supported unviable states like Jordan. Saudi Arabia is similar and, in addition, supports Islamic education in secular Moslem countries like Indonesia and Turkey. All buy themselves favorable public relations in Western countries through public relations efforts, grants, charities, and foundations.

The U.S. interest in the health and safety of Gulf Arab regimes is to ensure that this accretion of economic power remains in friendly hands and that no regional or outside power accrues sufficient influence to intimidate the Gulf Arabs away from their own interests and ours. To illustrate, one of the more plausible justifications for the Desert Shield/Storm operations was to keep Saddam's decade-long investments in military hardware from intimidating Gulf Arabs into cooperation with presumed Iraqi purposes, such as manipulating oil prices or acquiring nuclear capabilities.

Economic Factors

Oil profits are very large. First, production costs average some \$2 per barrel while the price of oil has fluctuated between \$10 and \$34 per barrel in the past decade. Second, profits for the richest producers are entirely out of proportion to their domestic requirements. This is because the Gulf Arabs (meaning actual citizens, rather than expatriate residents of Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] member states) have the world's largest proven reserves and a total population of some 10 million. For these countries, even after lavish provision of essential services to resident populations at public expense, there is much left for investment and deposit abroad and for financing imports, including arms, for themselves and for other states or movements in the region that Gulf governments wish to support.

Gulf states have been a major source of financial support to poorer countries in the region through outright gifts, budget support, and infrastructure investment. This largesse has declined in the post-Gulf War period and become more selective. Rebuilding Kuwait and regenerating its oil industry, although potentially profitable for U.S. firms, is absorbing a great deal of otherwise available capital. Large Saudi-borne support costs during the Gulf War have also diminished the available amount of excess capital. Less available excess capital forces choices of what to do with what there still is and suggests low local priority for rebuilding Iraq. Lower available funding also means much lower remittances for those who seemed sympathetic to the losing side in the Gulf War, such as the PLO, Yemen, and Jordan, and for some, lower arms expenditures.

Development within GCC states provide important sources of employment for Third World populations from within and from outside the Arab world. Egyptians, Jordanians, Yemenis, and especially Palestinians performed many of the jobs local workers were reluctant to do and thereby generated remittances that provide essential support for home economies (in the Palestinian case, for the West Bank and in Gaza). The Gulf War reduced employment opportunities in Iraq for all workers and in Kuwait for workers of noncoalition origin, such as Palestinians. Thousands were sent home, with near-catastrophic results on the West Bank and in Gaza, where Israeli security measures had already separated large numbers of Palestinian workers from their daily jobs in Israel proper.

Israel

The United States will continue to value Israel as the only modern and democratic state in the region. Israel may also remain a useful partner for intelligence-sharing arrangements and in developing some weapons of common interest like ATBMs. And the United States and Israel have agreed to store U.S. contingency equipment for regional U.S.

use on Israeli soil. Furthermore, political and sentimental ties will persist. It is even conceivable over some longer term that Israel could be one of a group of democratic regional states, should any such grouping ever emerge. On the other hand (or until then), it remains unclear how close relations with Israel advance U.S. interests in building stable coalitions in the Moslem and Arab worlds, unless the United States shows it can influence Israel in the direction of some Arab desiderata.

Democracy

One broad goal that has traditionally guided American foreign and defense policy is encouraging an international environment that enables democracy to flourish. An important component of that approach is the promotion and protection of states that share our values. Consistency would seem to require support of democratic norms for the Middle East. (How else to plausibly espouse democracy in Seoul, Singapore, Sofia, and Soweto?) Yet with respect to the Middle East, this goal has enjoyed a low priority for the last five decades. Local regimes seem disinclined to experiment with changes, and the historical experience suggests that in the Middle East, change in the apparent direction of democratic reforms often has unpredictable, nondemocratic results at least in the short term. Lebanon and Algeria provide two recent examples.

THREATS

Military

Specifically military threats to the U.S. interests identified above are at an all-time low. That reflects the end of the Cold War and with it the end to Soviet and former East Bloc subventions, weapons, and training to ugly regimes, notably Syria and Iraq; to Iraqi and Iranian power-projection capabilities; and (one hopes) to Iraq's unconventional weapon capabilities. However, various forms of political turmoil like the internal collapse and subsequent dismemberment of Iraq could present obvious threats to the future peace of the region, especially if Syria, Iran, and Turkey vie for advantage over the remaining pieces. Yet with the possible exception of Israel and Turkey, none of the regional players currently seems able to fight or sustain a war of any size. (Egypt and Syria could presumably initiate conflict, but their ability to sustain it without outside assistance seems questionable.)

In theory, postwar approaches to deterring an aggressor state in this region are easier to identify and implement after Desert Storm than they were before it. These approaches include:

- Enhancing self-defense capabilities of friendly states;

- Reducing the level of lethality of Middle Eastern forces by reducing arms transfers;
- Curbing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and weapon technology, including manufacturing technology;
- Building pressure against states that sponsor terrorism and subversion;
- Enhancing U.S. ability to intervene effectively and at low cost;
- Maintaining visible U.S. presence or prepositioned equipment locally.

There is an obvious contradiction between "enhancing the self-defense capabilities of friendly states" and "reducing the level of lethality for Middle East forces by reducing arms transfers." First, there is no historical basis for expecting that the coalition that defeated Iraq will remain united for that purpose, or for any other. Syria aside, no Arab state regards the *de facto* colonization of most of Lebanon by Syria as permanent or desirable. There is even less local sympathy for Israel's security zone in South Lebanon. Second, not all states that we perceive as friendly to us (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel) will be friendly toward each other; not all the states that border on each other in this region are friendly to us. Therefore, Iranian (and Syrian) acquisition of North Korean missile technology, whether directed at Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, could inspire interests in any of these potential target countries to upgrade their own missile arsenals or to acquire ATBM defenses. Such upgrades could, in turn, inspire further Iranian (and Syrian) acquisition of still more and better missiles.

Furthermore, all Middle East states, with the possible exception of Egypt, are inimical to, and claim to feel threatened by, Israel, especially now that Israel is arguably the strongest state and apparently, the only nuclear one. Thus, failure to cover Israel and its presumed nuclear capabilities under the terms of some hypothetical arms restraint will look like an incomplete arrangement to Arabs and to Iran. Coverage of Israel under *common* international safeguards with other Middle East states may compensate for the humiliation of having industrialized European suppliers impose supplier restraints on Third World clients. However, getting the Israelis to cooperate is another matter.

Also, it remains to be seen whether the traditional arms suppliers (Russia, United States, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria) or the new ones (China, the Koreas, Brazil) will restrain themselves in difficult economic times from once again meeting the demands of the always voracious Middle East arms market. Thus, it appears more likely that arms limitations may largely be confined to attempts at imposing supplier restraints on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon production technology and on the availability of technologies useful for upgrading missile reliability and accuracy.

From a policy viewpoint, the United States is caught between its long-term security interests (preventing or delaying a situation where any regional state is powerful enough to threaten any neighbor or challenge U.S. forces) and its short-term difficulties of restraining other arms suppliers and the American arms industry, which is now experiencing harder times.

Furthermore, the interests of long-term U.S. clients (Israel and the Gulf Arabs) diverge over Arab questions like Palestine. Governments of other U.S. client states (like Egypt), former and future clients (like Jordan), and former cobelligerents (like Syria) agree on very little beyond: (1) the importance of restraining Saddam; (2) making progress on the Palestine issue; (3) sharing more of the Gulf's oil wealth; and (4) keeping non-Arab powers (e.g., Iran, Turkey) out of dominant positions. Not all these goals are shared by the United States. Our principal interest remains in ensuring that neither the common goals of these states nor their differences results in some conflict that threatens our longer-term clients (the Gulf Arabs or Israel) and that no conflict expands to the point where external powers are required to protect oil or access to it. Given the weakness of all the regional protagonists, a visible U.S. presence, stored equipment, and the clear ability to return may be enough to deter direct conflict.

Internal troubles in this region are another matter entirely.

Other Insecurities

Most security arrangements depend on nation states and national governments as responsible parties. Unfortunately, the political cultures of the contemporary world are increasingly unable to absorb the worldwide pluralist explosion, the instantaneous communications that amplify it, and the systematic transnational connections across borders that it stimulates. Pluralism increasingly means the multiplication of conflicting belief systems and inducements to organize and communicate these beliefs and to espouse and support them at intensity levels set by the proponents. There is something primordial in the increase in worldwide provincialisms, chauvinisms, separatisms, ethnicisms, and fundamentalisms—in short, in people power that leaps walls and frontiers. Only yesterday, social unrest was largely a state problem whose eruption was usually effectively stifled inside state borders. Unrest was normally managed by existing governments rather than visited on the world community. Now, however, leaders have to scramble to deliver what they can to unsatisfied publics amid subnational and transnational forces below and around them that they cannot ultimately control. Thus, a significant event of the Gulf crisis was not that several Arab governments signed up to cooperate, but that each took calculated gambles with

respect to being able to survive forces and movements around them that are pervasive and powerful and that may ultimately drive those same governments from power.

The Gulf conflict may not have settled anything beyond who controls certain oil sources for now and who controls a given government. Those are not necessarily the principal problems in the Middle East, which (aside from distribution of wealth) have to do with how Islamic populations respond to historical change and how and whether to accommodate Western ideas. The alternatives (reactionary revival, total Westernization, or synthesis) all seem unlikely solutions, the first because it is inherently impractical, and the other two because they seem likely to lack authenticity and practicality as a program for ordinary people in an integrally religious society.² Outside the Arab Gulf states, most Middle East governments face large numbers of unemployed and perhaps unemployable young men with real and fancied grievances and few prospects. For these young men, the enemy consists of those who are better off and those not identifiably like minded—in short, the victorious, industrialized, and Christian-Roumi-Crusader “West,” the United States, the Zionist Entity, and the Gulf states and their local agents and lackeys. For the disadvantaged and dispossessed, these appear to form a combination whose presumed interest in the status quo can be collectively vilified as the conspiratorial cause of all perceived ills. Secular collective solutions—Marxist socialism and its essentially Fascist cousins, Baath socialism and Phalangism—seem increasingly discredited. “Palestine” and “Arab unity,” however, if still popular goals and assumptions, remain frustratingly out of reach. God, however, whose will it presumably all is, is not out of reach, if government returns to its true purposes of providing conditions that allow men to be better Moslems.

Such poisonous stews pose dangers to local governments that must pay continuing attention to the mob’s concerns and to the latest fashions in political posturing, both at home and in neighboring states. Thus, for each Arab State, public policy is warped and constrained, and scarce resources are employed in building and maintaining the machinery of coercive control.

The policy temptation for the United States and its Gulf Arab partners, states primarily interested in “stability” (meaning an absence of turmoil), is to help governments, no matter how obnoxious, retain local control. This is because the messy and unpredictable process of moving toward democracy often means allowing dangerous movements to contend; such contention can have serious short-term costs, like enshrining some currently

²William Pfaff, “Islam and the West,” *The New Yorker*, February 12, 1991, pp. 83–88.

fashionable and militant cluster of illusions as a dominant national goal. The Iranian revolution is only the most recent example.

Furthermore, the Gulf Arabs, religious conservatives all, have different views than the United States has of what an acceptable government might be. Yet in the longer term, reinforcing the status quo may be as dangerous as supporting democratic change. Pent-up frustrations eventually explode. Chaos, in the Lebanese style, is one possible result. In short, the terrorist problem, which could be declining now that Syria and Iran, the national supporters of terrorist groups, seem more inclined to cooperate, could come back in forms that are harder to control.

Influencing Gulf Arab governments to invest in more labor-intensive operations in poorer Arab states and using their considerable financial power to attract others to the same tasks may be the best insurance Gulf Arabs could buy on their own behalf and on ours. Unfortunately, thanks to the effects of the Gulf War, few of the Gulf Arab states have the loose capital necessary to start this sort of effort promptly. Yet unless the present and future adult generations in the poorer Arab states have some visible prospects of better lives, they may try to make ours worse.

8. LATIN AMERICA

CHANGES

Despite the gradual breakdown of authoritarian rule, economic stability and effective political systems seem as remote as ever in most of Latin America. The long process of change from military rule in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina has yet to produce the confidence on which stable, popular, and responsive regimes (and prosperity itself) depend. Drug problems, chronic social unrest, and continuing patterns of oligarchical control undermine efforts at orderly progress in the Andean countries. Rapid population growth and overpressures on natural resources threaten remaining natural habitats over much of the region with destruction and imply future adverse global effects, which are still only partly understood.

Many of the above statements could have been made in the 1950s, with only minor alterations. But the hemisphere's situation is far more desperate now. Then, foreign aid was "new and shiny"; it was assumed that the developed world had formulas that, if applied or even suggested, would alter the direction of Latin development and inspire growth and political stability. Global lending institutions like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) were still largely untried, and the Alliance for Progress still lay ahead. Today, after billions in loans, endless hours of advice, thousands of plans, and a population of skilled and knowledgeable Western university graduates in virtually every Latin government, we better understand the problems, but we do not have solutions.

Latin America's relative global importance is shrinking. Although overall exports are growing, they continue to decline as a proportion of world exports. (Latin America's exports, which amounted to almost 13 percent of the global total in the 1950s, are less than 4 percent today.) Furthermore, if the net export of capital from the entire region is declining, it is still far too high to allow for stable growth.

Overall, Latin America experienced a deep recession in the 1980s from which it has yet to emerge. Annual growth for the entire region averaged 3.6 percent in the 1970s, but fell 8.3 percent between 1981 and 1989. Although countries vary widely in decline, only Colombia, Chile, Barbados, and the Dominican Republic registered growth during this

period.¹ Severe debt and the burdens of debt service continue to inhibit growth, although structural and regulatory inhibitions to investment may be important too. West European and U.S. investors and donors are limited in what they can do. Some, like the United States and Britain, are inhibited by slowing recession economies. Most seem somewhat stopped by lender awareness of Latin America's past spotty repayment habits and by new demands on increasingly scarce funds for Eastern Europe and the victims of the Gulf War.

The Cold War is over. The "Soviet" involvement in Latin countries, which used to stimulate countervailing U.S. aid and investment, is virtually over. Latin America loses from the withdrawal of Soviet power and influence in Europe and globally. Latin governments can no longer use Cold War arguments to draw attention to themselves, to blackmail donors, or to justify national posturing at U.S. expense. Even the Japanese, normally considered the logical supplement or successors to U.S. and European donors and investors, seem capital short and reluctant to invest for the moment. Thus, neither the United States, Europe, nor Japan has the resources or the inclination to address the region's many problems anytime soon in any scope large or comprehensive enough to make a difference.

In Central America, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas and the replacement of Noriega suggest an increase in the number of countries that are democratic in form. If the Panama invasion was locally popular when it happened, it was less enthusiastically received elsewhere in Latin America. Castro is more and more isolated, both as a potential model for the region (few wish to emulate Cuba any longer) and as a conduit for Marxist ideas, materiel, and tutelage. For their part, the East Europeans are out of the game, and Russian subventions to Cuba are now close to zero.

Social chasms between oligarches, the military, and the rest of the population in most Central American states continue to underpin social unrest and civil strife. Salvador and Guatemala currently have the most acute problems. Salvador's seemingly perpetual rebellion now in abeyance demonstrated that if the rebellion cannot be put down militarily, its popular support was not widespread enough to sustain a genuine popular uprising. Nevertheless, 57,000 Salvadoran troops seemed unable to defeat some 7,000 left-wing insurgents. Although both sides have agreed to cease-fires (both claim to agree that peace is the best solution), the extent of mutual toleration and sympathy between the parties remains small. After 11 years of effort and six billion dollars in U.S. expenditures (making Salvador

¹United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, in GIST, *Debt and Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean*, March 11, 1991, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.

the sixth-largest aid recipient, worldwide), El Salvador, a country of 5.5 million people, is not much closer to stability and democracy than it was in 1981 when the present assistance effort began. In the mid-eighties, a militarily more successful effort in Guatemala, resulting in some 125,000 deaths, reduced the insurgency there to a low but continuing simmer.

Improvements in travel and communication, increases in unrest and mayhem, and disparities between opportunities here and in southern countries of origin have increased Latin and Caribbean emigration to a flood. Where yesterday most immigrants from Western Hemisphere countries were sojourners content to stay for a few years and return home with their savings, more and more have come north to settle. In Florida, Texas, New York, and California, Latin populations have become factors in U.S. politics. Over time, these populations, like other immigrant groups before them, will pressure the government to focus more attention and resources on Latin America and its problems and will influence the content of policy. Also, unrest, poverty, and social/structural problems in the Andean countries have combined with social and demographic changes in the United States to create incentives for large cocaine production, refinement, and distribution operations in the Andean states and in the Caribbean.

Mexico is increasingly active in Central America as an aid donor and mediator between warring factions. Mexico has provided \$1.3 billion in the past 11 years and played host to accommodation talks among the Salvadoran and Guatemalan factions in May 1991. Such efforts are in Mexico's interest. Some 300,000 illegals enter Mexico each year, mostly refugees escaping strife in Central America. Many settle in refugee camps in Mexico close to the Guatemalan frontier, where their presence occasionally brings Mexican troops into sharp contact with Guatemalan forces in pursuit.² Mexico remains the most significant Third World country for the United States. In 1992 the United States agreed to a North American Free Trade Area that would involve the United States with Mexico and Canada in the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and in the creation of a continental open investment climate and a common intellectual copyright regime. Mexico in turn has liberalized opportunities for foreign investment and ownership. Trade with Mexico continues to rise, achieving \$52 billion in 1989 and an estimated \$59 billion in 1990.³

²Juanita Darling, "Mexico Savors Role as Mediator in Central American Conflicts," *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1991.

³GIST, *North American Free Trade Agreement*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, March 6, 1991.

INTERESTS

U.S. interests in the Latin American region are historic, strategic, emotional, economic, nuclear, and increasingly ethnographic and ecological. Historically, the United States has attempted to prevent powers or influences external to this hemisphere from taking root. This policy, sometimes referred to as the Monroe Doctrine, has been flexibly applied. Originally designed to safeguard the Western Hemisphere from resurgent European colonialism, it has been cited as a justification by U.S. administrations when preventing German commercial encroachments in the Caribbean (Haiti), inhibiting French ambitions in Mexico (Maximillian), and, most recently, to resisting what was regarded as Soviet exploitation of local and regional dissatisfactions.

U.S. strategic, economic, nuclear, and ecological interests are identified and briefly described below.

Outside Agitators Depart!

Justified as support for the Cuban revolution, and for a variety of other revolutionary movements mostly in the Caribbean, the 1961 attempt to deploy medium-range Soviet missiles in Cuba supported arguments that the USSR was attempting to establish a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. That strategic foothold threatened not only U.S. interests, but the United States itself.

With the USSR as a visible rival in our own backyard, U.S. policy stressed highlighting the American role as the dominant regional power and as the most important actor in the Caribbean basin. Thus, accretions of power to states or movements that could be seen as supporting Soviet interests were to be resisted. Resist we did, occasionally by employing direct or surrogate force, as in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. U.S. military activity made clear that the Caribbean region was secure for U.S. power and U.S. clients, and for U.S. presence and U.S. passage, and that the most important local strategic asset, the Canal, was safe.

U.S. interests in meeting and defeating Cold War rivals in Latin America declined with the Cold War itself. Little of that purpose remains in anything like its original form. Still defiant Cuba led by the intransigent Fidel Castro, is now an embarrassment for Russian policy. The former USSR's other major clients, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front), no longer count on Russian support. Even if Russian policy should reverse, it seems doubtful that a Russian government could generate the resources necessary to reestablish anything like the perceived threats of the 1980s.

Cuba and Salvador have become minor domestic issues in the United States, with some small constituencies pressing for continuation of current policies, the end of the Cold War notwithstanding. Many Cuban Americans would like to overturn Castro's regime, so any move toward accommodation with Castro remains hostage to some extent not only to Castro's own behavior, but also to U.S. domestic interest in progress toward his removal. On the other hand, since the Bay of Pigs, there is no significant proportion of the public that would be willing to apply force for this purpose.

Training and supporting the Salvadoran armed forces in the hope of producing an apolitical national army responsive to democratic civilian control has been a decade-long failure. Six billion dollars over 11 years has produced little beyond the avoidance of a bloodbath between antagonists, many of whose members remain convinced that the current standoff might best be resolved by physically eliminating the opposition. By most accounts the Salvadoran armed forces remain immune to U.S. political blandishments. They have become neither an efficient fighting force nor an apolitical national servant subordinate to civilian authority. Instead, they may have become little more than an expensive and self-serving collection of thugs, with an institutional agenda far different from the democratic one that the United States espouses. Most Americans don't seem to care much any more. In 1990, when the Civil War was still on, only 28 percent of the U.S. public said they would be willing to use U.S. forces to prevent the government of Salvador from being defeated by the FMLN.⁴ The end of the fighting seems to have come just in time.

Democracy

Renewed U.S. espousal of democracy may not be as well received in Latin America as we might wish. On its face, democracy seems to be a general desideratum and an apparent if insufficient prerequisite for other forms of progress. Unfortunately, espousal of democracy was a common justification for U.S. interference in the decades before the Cold War. It may still require some effort to assure Latin politicians that our interests in democracy in each country are confined to orderly operation of the democratic process and that there are material rewards for pursuing it. Resistance to democracy also remains formidable for internal reasons. Some societies like Salvador are so divided that it will be hard to generate the civility and tolerance on which the orderly operation of democratic process depends. The emergence of successful models may help in the longer term. In particular, democratic progress in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina could inspire some emulation, when and if it

⁴John E. Reilly (ed.), *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991, p. 34.

becomes clear that democracy also means better lives for more people. Some Central American states may even find it possible eventually to copy Costa Rica. Few have tried and succeeded in the past 40 years.

Attractive Climates for U.S. Investment

A safe climate means local laws and regulations that are hospitable to foreign investment and a politically stable environment. In Latin America, "stable" is more likely to mean a low level of social unrest rather than danger of war. The internal security situation in Peru and Colombia, for example, is a continuing cause for alarm and suggests progressive breakdown of the social and political order, threatened in Peru by Shining Path terrorists and in Colombia by drug cartels. Thus, stability requires economic growth and enough altruism in each society to allow the disadvantaged a reasonable share. Growing prosperity and a stable climate also serve a more awkward U.S. purpose—keeping Latin Americans at home and thus avoiding sudden and massive immigration surges such as those that normally flow from acute unrest. Yet if the preferred U.S. approach to prosperity and stability in Latin America is democracy and development through free-market forces, no one has yet derived the formula let alone identified the external resources to bring either about.

A hemispheric free-trade area, following the organization of a North American one, apparently represents one U.S. notion of how to begin. Another is the 1989 Brady Plan, which encourages voluntary negotiated debt and debt-service reduction with commercial creditors as a complement to renewed bank lending, domestic and foreign investment, and, hopefully, the return of flight capital. So far, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, and Venezuela have reached Brady Plan agreements to restructure and reduce their external commercial debt. The United States also continues to encourage international and foreign lending institutions to pay more attention to Latin America and the Caribbean.

Safe and Efficient Canal Operations

The Panamanians, who will need the earnings of the Canal after 1999, have as large a stake in the continued efficient operation of the Canal as the United States has. This combination of U.S. and local interest may be enough to ensure efficient management and perhaps even timely investment in maintenance and modernization. The Army Corps of Engineers can presumably be relied on to monitor that process and to make any anticipated shortfalls a matter of timely public debate, both in Panama and in the United States. Egypt's orderly operation of the Suez waterway since 1956 may be a useful paradigm.

Less Cocaine

Less drug cultivation, lower production in the Andean countries, and reduced drug transit through the Caribbean area are clearly desirable. Reducing cultivation may depend as much on finding an alternative cash crop and a market for it as on any coercive measures that the Andean governments and the United States can apply. So far, it has been hard to convince farmers to plant alternative crops.

In September 1989, the administration unveiled a five-year, \$2 billion aid program to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru and sent more than 100 U.S. military personnel to train Colombian security forces to fight drug producers and traffickers. If governments welcomed U.S. commitment to help fight the cartels, there was some resentment that Latin American supplier states were being scapegoated for U.S. reluctance or inability to deal with the consumption dimension at home. There was also some resentment at the gap between U.S. anti-drug rhetoric and the actual scale of assistance. Most important, the failure to achieve decisive progress since 1989 seems to have induced fatigue and some willingness to compromise with the drug cartels in Colombia. On the other hand, there has been some progress in inhibiting drug transit through the Caribbean.

Ecosystem Salvation

Like the rest of the world, the United States has a growing interest in the survival of tropical rain forests, animal and plant species, and other global ecological factors indigenous to Latin America. Yet it seems unlikely that, absent any significant environmental assistance or donor willingness to couple insistence on ecological action with broad measures of debt relief, governments can be impelled to act. Even if they try, governments do not always have the power to compel. This was illustrated in the Brazilian army's refusal to remove gold miners from the Yanomani Indian reserve near the Venezuelan border in 1989.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

U.S. nonproliferation interests are the same for Latin America as for other regions. However, unlike other regions, a special nuclear regime exists for Latin America, the 1967 treaty of Tlateloco, or Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. In that agreement, the contracting parties agreed on exclusively peaceful use for the facilities and nuclear materials on their respective territories and, among other things, abjured nuclear testing, weapon possession, receipt, storage, installation, or nuclear deployment on their own behalf or on behalf of any other party. Participants were also bound to submit materials and facilities to IAEA

safeguards to help ensure compliance.⁵ Argentina signed the treaty, but did not ratify it. Brazilian adherence was conditional. Both countries have important nuclear programs, have been nuclear rivals, and have occasionally been suspected of intending to become nuclear weapon states, Tlateloco notwithstanding. In November 1990, however, both countries agreed to ban weapon production, to submit to IAEA safeguards, and to abide by the terms of Tlateloco.⁶ Firming up both government's stated determination should remain an important U.S. policy goal.

Secure Southern Border

As the only First World country bordering on a Third World country, the United States has familiar problems controlling the flow of immigration. Local efforts to provide jobs that improve living conditions on the Mexican side of the frontier may have stemmed some of the immigration from the northern parts of Mexico without affecting the traffic from southern Mexico or from countries further south. Social and political cohesion in Mexico thus becomes a policy interest for the United States because collapse, or unrest, can increase cross-border traffic north to unmanageable proportions.

Weapon Supplier Restraint

Brazil and to a lesser extent Argentina are growing weapon producers for Third World clients. Brazil is suspected of having helped Iraq upgrade its missile arsenal and specifically of having helped increase Scud range. Any future international export constraint regime would require cooperation of these arms manufacturing countries, lest they become alternative suppliers. As with the drug trade, success with them depends to an important extent on how well restraint proponents like the United States can identify alternative earning opportunities of comparable scope for them, and on whether they are willing to restrain themselves.

THREATS

The primary threats to U.S. interests in Latin America are derived from continued economic stagnation as populations rise. That combination leads to civil strife, authoritarian rule, ecological disaster, increased emigration, and disinclination to forgo easy earnings from drugs and arms. Stagnation and unrestrained population growth can compound capital flight and corruption and increase relative technological backwardness through continuing

⁵"Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements," *USACDA*, 1982, pp. 59-60.

⁶Shirley Christian, "Argentina and Brazil Renounce Atomic Weapons," *New York Times International*, November 29, 1990.

undercapitalization, thereby lowering the confidence that progress and investment require. Over time, situations may arise where literally no one can govern or where in most Latin countries the government's writ does not run far outside the major cities or the capital district. These factors suggest some review of security arrangements within the inter-American system, a review more focused on internal and transnational dangers.

It is hard to identify an *actual* current security threat to the Panama Canal. The principal remaining *generic* threat to the security of the Canal may be some Panamanian movement that might wish to hold Canal operations hostage to the Panamanian government's satisfaction of some local grievance. In that sense, the sudden departure of U.S. forces from the Panama Canal could be seen locally as a decline in U.S. interests in the region and evidence that local movements formerly inhibited by U.S. presence now had a freer hand. Conceivably, abrupt or capricious changes in U.S. forces could therefore help bring on the very sorts of challenges to local stability that we would wish to avoid.

Like all national emergencies, ongoing insurgencies slow progress and provide excuses to forestall or delay social reform. Therefore, an end to military contests between concerned governments and the cocaine cartels and affiliates in Colombia—the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, the FMLN in El Salvador, and other contestants—could help focus attention on democracy and social change, an obvious prescription that is very difficult to apply.

A Sendero victory in Peru, or the prospect of one, may not threaten U.S. interests directly, but may nevertheless create perceptions that require some U.S. response. If the Sendero wins, Peru's neighbors may feel threatened and tempted to intervene, whether in an Organization of American States (OAS) framework, directly as individual states, or in combination. Such intervention could increase drug production in Sendero areas and involve calls for assistance by Peru's neighbors. Conversely, Peru's own armed forces may decide that the Sendero threat requires extreme measures, resulting in a bloodbath whose consequences neither the OAS, the UN, nor the United States could avoid noticing or ultimately reacting to. Either could lead to a spread of the rebellion beyond Peru and to massive follow-on rescue and reconstruction operations.

An uprising in Cuba seems increasingly possible, as internal misery increases with no effective relief in sight. Past history suggests that at some point in the rebellion the United States would become a party to the dispute in the hope of shaping the outcome. It is not farfetched to think that a party in revolt, presumably backed by elements in the American body politic, will try to draw the United States in as early as possible.

U.S. lines of communication to points in and around Latin America seem unthreatened for the foreseeable future, except perhaps by insurgents. No foreign power seems inclined to challenge them.

9. AFRICA

CHANGES

Most African leaders are riveted by Africa's dim economic prospects. Although there are exceptions, the grim economic outlook for most countries includes "weak agricultural growth, a decline in industrial output, climbing debt and ecological degradation."¹ Thus, the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the concurrent changes in Russian policy (notably the end of "Soviet" interest in confronting the West in the Third World) had negative echoes almost all over Africa. The 1989 upheavals meant the end of Soviet and East European subventions for like-minded African states and movements. These events also ended prospects for inviting attention to local problems in Cold War terms. Few U.S. administrations would now care much or pay much out of concern that some small, poor country threatened to adopt Marxist solutions to its internal problems or threatened to establish an arms supply relationship with Russia.

Furthermore, as Marxist-leaning governments discovered that prospects for more East European aid were gone and that Soviet support was about to cease, African leaders of all persuasions began lamenting the prospective loss of attention and aid from Europe and the United States, which shifted to the needs of Eastern Europe. The Gulf War added to African concern about future sources of support in that, at least in the short term, there would be less Arab capital from Gulf states, even for Moslem populations and Islamic interests.

West European assistance for Africa may top off at the level set by the 1989 Lome Conference, less than \$14 billion over a five-year period. There is no evidence that U.S. assistance will increase, except perhaps short-term humanitarian assistance for Africa's staggering number of refugees (estimated at some 16 million), who are mostly victims of famine and war in Liberia, the Horn, Angola, Mozambique, and the Sudan. Outside North Africa, where local elections have been held in Tunisia and Algeria, spotty progress toward democracy continues to reflect concern by African leaders that democratization would lead to tribal fault lines in and between countries established inside artificial colonial frontiers. Lesotho (and perhaps Namibia) may be the sole exceptions.

Yet some of the chronic strife that has plagued Africa seems to be ending. It appears that the two rebellions against the Ethiopian regime have succeeded in changing the government in Addis Ababa. Any follow-on government will need considerable assistance to

¹"Strategic Survey 1989-1990," IISS, London, p. 63.

overcome the effects of drought, famine, and decades-long civil strife. Also, the right-wing rebellion against Mozambique's formerly Marxist government seems to be ready for parlay with Machel's regime, now that it has renounced Marxism. And the Polisario uprising in the Western Sahara may be ending, if the details of the 1988 agreement calling for plebiscite can be worked out between the local populations and Morocco.² Most important, South Africa seems to be changing. Anti-apartheid legislation and the opening of a dialogue between black African leaders and the government suggest prospects of peaceful transformation. Unfortunately, bloody strife between rival factions could affect the pace and character of national transformation.

Liberia, however, remains a shambles a half a year after the uprisings against Sergeant Doe's government, as does Angola after an abortive attempt at free election. Struggles in the Sudan between an increasingly intransigent Arab and Islamic government in the North and its black Christian and Animist subjects in the southern third of the country continue to foster famine and death. More strife can be expected in other African countries as economic conditions get worse and as unrepresented groups led by unemployed intelligentsia struggle for recognition. Finally, overpopulation, overgrazing, declining animal populations, overcutting of timber, and other land abuse imply important African contributions to global ecological troubles.

INTERESTS AND THREATS

For most of the American people, interest in Africa is low and intermittent at best. Economic assistance, Africa's principal need, is unpopular. If 50 percent of the U.S. public favors economic aid to other countries in principle, 64 percent also favors cutting back on economic assistance abroad.³ General public interest in aid to Africa arises during crises. Africa gets attention in response to African events that resonate politically or emotionally in the United States. Examples include resistance to South African apartheid and disasters that play effectively if only momentarily on television, like famines, wars, and refugee flows. All of Africa accounts for less than 1.7 percent of U.S. trade.

The major exception to the general public indifference is the African-American community. Leaders of that community were largely responsible for making South African apartheid a public issue in the United States. They, along with U.S. Christian and now Moslem religious leaders, are also instrumental in publicizing those African events that

²George L. Sherry, *The UN Reborn*, The Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 1990.

³John E. Reilly (ed.), *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991, p. 27.

require or would benefit from external remedies. The AIDS crisis in Africa may provide the next example. Some African-American leaders have also spent considerable effort to forge relationships between African countries and the African-American community in the United States and to raise African consciousness in the African-American population. Yet aside from South African issues, these links have yet to build the sorts of ethnic backpressures on U.S. policy that other U.S. groups have succeeded in establishing on behalf of beneficiaries abroad such as Ireland, Italy, Israel, Greece, and Poland.

With the end of the Cold War, plausible U.S. security interests that suggest military requirements have become hard to find in Africa. If we would not wish the Suez Canal to be closed to American shipping or have the Cape of Good Hope fall into unfriendly hands to threaten innocent maritime passage, who are the parties who might actually do either? With the Gulf War success behind us and the Cold War in abeyance in the Middle East, who or whose client controls the Horn no longer seems worth worrying about. Nor is the ideological orientation of the ultimate winners in the Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Western Sahara, or Eritrean struggles. If instability in the Maghreb is potentially worrisome, these countries represent important strategic interests to Spain, France, and Italy, all of whom possess considerable resources for dealing with troubles there and might not always welcome U.S. help. Libya, with its apparent continuing interest in fomenting regional and global mayhem, may be the sole remaining potential target of U.S. military action in present-day North Africa.

South African cohesion and the avoidance of civil war represent humanitarian and domestic political interests that the United States can support by helping ensure continued international pressure for orderly and continuing negotiations among the major South African parties. Limited U.S. leverage on these players includes publicity and exposure to U.S. audiences for proponent views, coordination of policy pressures with European states, and sanctions. Some have argued that continued and unimpeded access to South Africa's mineral resources represents a U.S. national security interest. However, the multiple number of sources for most mineral products, the end of the Cold War, the rising number of substitute materials appearing every year (petroleum aside), and the large U.S. strategic stockpile all raise questions about whether that idea still has much value, if it ever did.

In Africa, as in Latin America, what may grow as the century ends are the number of human and ecological rescue operations that the international community undertakes on behalf of local victims and on its own behalf. Large-scale military rescues, like the 1961 Congo operation, may again be required if now visible economic trends produce anticipated

violent political reactions. New types of operations to save animal populations or rain forests could be contemplated. More likely, the developed world may instead try to impede ecologically damaging behaviors by paying to avoid them.

10. CONCLUSIONS

It is tempting to suggest that the Cold War was somehow an ahistorical pause between more familiar or natural-seeming patterns, like the periods before and just after the First World War. As then, the anticipated threats to peace and order are the collapse of empires, and the outbreak of tribal and religious conflicts between mutually uncongenial populations forced to coexist within borders imposed by outsiders.

Yet the world of the 1990s is fundamentally different from the world of the 1890s, or the 1920s.

- Then, conquest of nature was still one of the agreed purposes of civilization; its preservation is now an agreed global purpose.
- Then, military technology was only lethal; now it threatens to annihilate species.
- Then, faraway events promptly appeared as newsprint, for the literate minority in dominant countries. Today, global events are visible to virtually all when they happen, if not exactly as they happen.
- Then, a weak and disintegrating state was a temptation for rival powers to impose their influence; today, national disintegration is often a worrisome phenomenon for the larger powers, an incentive for collective action, or an opportunity to avoid taking responsibility.
- Then, the world was divided between rich developed countries and colonial territories. Today, some of the latter have become rich and developed. The rest are independent, but often in turmoil.
- Then, the world had 1.5 billion people; today, it has some 5 billion.

These changes and the foregoing analysis suggest a few tentative conclusions. With the end of the bipolar world, it is much more difficult to identify military contingencies with enough precision to permit the optimal and detailed force planning that the Cold War permitted and required. What is obvious from the foregoing is greater emphasis on expeditionary forces, without knowing exactly where they are to be employed. A worst-case planning factor for designing such a force may be a requirement for unilateral opposed entry against a medium-sized power some distance from the United States.

Most identifiable threats to U.S. interests are not amenable to military solutions. These include refugee and migration flows, drug problems, social unrest, unfriendly transnational political movements, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ecological

disasters, and medical emergencies. All these imply future troubles without suggesting obvious solutions.

Some of tomorrow's problems may be like those of the day before yesterday, small wars in remote areas in support of some clear national interest, such as defending U.S. lives and property. Yet what the foregoing sections indicate is that most conflicts that do break out seem unlikely to be of sufficient concern to the United States to warrant unilateral use of U.S. forces against foreign states. Instability may be a pervasive and unpleasant prospect, but not necessarily one which need involve American armed forces much, at least not unilaterally. In that sense, the United States may be safer from outside threats than at any previous time in its national history.

As the century ends, American governments may find it more congenial to stress collective action in most overseas military operations, for that high proportion of potential cases where no important U.S. interest can be identified. Collective action has the virtue of limiting exposure in cases where the United States might wish some involvement, but would be reluctant to bear the full burden.